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I.   INTRODUCTION AND CRITERIA
Five years ago I committed the academic sin of endorsing hierarchy
by compiling The Top Ten Politically Correct Law Reviews .1 I quickly
learned that the ranking game is a lightning rod for controversy and
criticism.2 While some journals were irritated for being listed, others
were chagrined at being excluded. 3 Professor Lawrence Cunningham of
Cardozo Law School4 said: “Categorizing law reviews in terms of political
correctness obscures the broader range of scholarship they publish.” 5
Another critic wrote that while my article is “concise, entertaining, and
frank,”6 the effect was not benign: “[T]he discussion of new ideas should
not be stifled just because they are new.” 7 The fact that my piece did in-
cite criticism disproved my critics’ accusation that I wanted to stifle dis-
                                                                                                                                                
* Edgar A. Hahn Professor of Jurisprudence, Case Western Reserve University, Cleve-
land, Ohio.
1. See  Arthur Austin, The Top Ten Politically Correct Law Reviews, 1994 UTAH L. R EV.
1319 (1994). The top ten: Cardozo Law Review, Yale Law Journal , Michigan Law Review,
Southern California University Law Review , Stanford Law Review, Buffalo Law Review,
Cornell Law Review, Wisconsin Law Review, Colorado Law Review, Harvard Law Review.
See id.
2. Deans are highly critical of law school rankings unless their school is in the top twenty.
See  Cynthia Cotts, Deans and Watchdogs Flunk U.S. News Law School Rankings, NAT’L L.J .,
Mar. 2, 1998, at A13; see also  Jan Hoffman, Judge Not Law, Schools Demand of a Magazine
That Ranks Them, N.Y. TIMES , Feb. 19, 1998, at A1.
3. See  Ken Myers, David Letterman, Watch Out: Professor Issues Top 10 of “PC", NAT’L
L.J ., Mar. 13, 1995, at A20; see also  Reviews Reviewed: Scholar Assigns “PC” Ranking, A.B.A.
J ., June 1995, at 44.
4. Cardozo Law Review was ranked number one for publishing things like the decon -
struction of a court summons. See  Charles M. Yablon, Forms, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1349, 1352
(1990) (“[T]he language of the summons is indeterminate on a number of levels, but that does
not mean that it lacks meaning.”).
5. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Openness to Ideas Isn’t Political Correctness, Letter, NAT’L
L.J ., Mar. 27, 1995, at A20.
6. Cheryl B. Preston, It Moves, Even If We Don’t: A Reply to Arthur Austin, The Top Ten
Politically Correct Law Reviews, 63 TENN . L. REV. 735, 735 (1996).
7. Id. at 738.
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cussion. The emergence of new styles and methods of scholarship is in-
deed a serious issue that I intend to continue exploring.
Reading hundreds of articles in researching a book on legal scholar-
ship confirms that politically correct writing appears with increasing fre-
quency, creating a split between the advocates of conventional doctrinal
scholarship and nontraditional writing.8 The American Association of
Law Schools contributed to the split by encouraging faculty to avoid
“prejudice against any particular methodology or perspective used in
teaching or scholarship.”9 This would presumably embrace photography,
poetry, and paintings. 10 The conflict over the relevance of politically cor-
rect scholarship confirms its resonance11 and to further the scope of the
debate—and provoke the critics—it is time to rank the top ten politically
correct law review articles.
A top-ten ranking is a convenient and entertaining way to draw at-
tention to the hostilities generated by nontraditional scholarship. It pro-
vides the ideal vehicle to critically evaluate what I consider the best rep-
resentatives of the new scholarship. Each article constitutes a different
technique for rebellion against tradition.
Political correctness (PC) is a buzzword 12 of nebulous parameters. In
the university community it is associated with language modification,
oppression studies, race and gender victimization, rejection of the white
male canon, plus a laundry list of etceteras. In the law academy PC is
defined by specific goals, agendas, and vocabulary. It is oppositional to
the Liberal white male culture of objectivity, rationality, and the
Langdellian principle of law as a science.13 Advocates come from three
sources: Critical Race theorists composed of Blacks and females, femi-
nists, plus the remnants of the Critical Legal Studies movement.14 The
unifying assumption is that minorities and females speak in a distinctive
                                                                                                                                                
8. See  ARTHUR AUSTIN , THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: OUTSIDERS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER
LEGAL EDUCATION  (1998).
9. Report of the AALS Special Committee on Tenure and the Tenuring Process, 42 J.
LEGAL EDU. 477, 505 (1992).
10. For example, artwork, acrylic on canvas entitled, The Painting: Naked Restraints of
Trade, originally submitted as an antitrust exam answer was published in a law journal as
“original jurisprudence.” Christo Lassiter, A Call to the Arts: Exploring New Means of Juris-
prudential Expression , 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J . 387, 388 (1996) (explaining how artwork
is a valid and effective expression of legal concepts).
11. See  DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY , BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997); see also  Arthur Austin, Evaluating Storytelling as
a Type of Nontraditional Scholarship, 74 NEB. L. REV. 479 (1995).
12. See  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 192 (3d College ed. 1988) (“[A] word or
phrase used by members of some in-group having little or imprecise meaning but sounding im-
pressive to outiders.”).
13. See  Josef Redlich, The Common Law and the Case Method in American University
Law Schools, 8 CARNEG. FOUND . BUL. 11 (1914) (“Law, considered as a science, consists of ce r-
tain principles or doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with
constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a
true lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the business of every earnest student
of law.”).
14. See  AUSTIN, supra note 8, at ch. 1.
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voice derived from privileged access to the perspective and experience of
victimization,15 and that their stories deserve recognition.16
I start my evaluation with a judgment of the extent to which the
ranked article adds to Law Political Correctness (LPC) ideology. Authors
do not get points for incrementalism, i.e. repackaging or reshuffling ex-
isting thoughts without adding new substance. I award points for the
presentation of unique oppositional critique. Robin West, for example,
seeks to demonstrate male and female differences and posits that
women’s suffering and pain are ignored or trivialized by the male-
dominated legal culture. Her scholarship develops a critical legal method
for describing women’s subjective hedonic lives. 17 Oppositional ideology
incorporates provocation or what the Crits18 call “trashing.”19 LPC uses
trashing to ridicule the Liberal white male establishment’s dedication to
rational and analytical scholarship. Crits call it demystification or un-
masking the delusion of determinacy and certainty. “Take specific argu-
ments very seriously in their own terms; discover they are actually fool-
ish ([tragi]-comic); and then look for some (external observer’s) order
(not  the germ of truth) in the internally contradictory, incoherent chaos
we’ve exposed.”20
Trashing is an art, easily abused by the overzealous writer. It can be
ad hominem, like Mark Tushnet calling Lawrence Tribe’s constitutional
law treatise corrupt,21 or Jerome Culp writing: “[The] ‘real’ Judge Pos-
ner, however, is no different than the white slaveowners in the
antebellum South who were kind to their slaves . . . .”22 Trashing can also
be silly, such as encouraging Crit colleagues “to engage in acts of ‘macho
self-immolation,’ to become moral terrorists, to ‘whack-off’ in faculty
                                                                                                                                                
15. See  Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J.  2007, 2038 (1991)
(“[T]he voice of color is identified and synonymous with marginalized groups in our society
whose marginal outside status enables them to relate important stories—stories that cannot be
sincerely told by their privileged majoritarian peers.”); see also  Martha Minow, The Supreme
Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 H ARV. L. REV. 10, 61 (1987) (“Feminist
work has thus named the power of naming and has challenged both the use of male measures
and the assumption that women fail by them.”). The boilerplate re ference for female victimiza-
tion is CAROL GILLIGAN , IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN ’S
DEVELOPMENT (1982). See  Joan M. Shaughnessy, Gilligan’s Travels, 7 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 3-5
(1988).
16. See  Patricia Meisol, A New Genre of Legal Scholarship, L.A. TIMES , Oct. 7, 1988, at 8
(“We need to flood the market with our own stories until we get one simple point across” ac-
cording to Robin West and that point “is that women’s experiences, values and fears are differ-
ent from men’s experiences, values and fears.”).
17. See  Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS . WOMEN ’S L.J . 81 (1987).
18. See  Hope Yen, As HLS Mulls Its Mission, CLS Scholars Remain Quiet , HARV. L.
RECORD , Dec. 1, 1995, at 2 (explaining that “Crit” is a term used to denote scholars of Critical
Legal Studies).
19. See  Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984).
20. Id. at 293. “[D]ebunking is one part of an explicit effort to level, to reintegrate the
communities we live in along explicitly egalitarian lines rather than along the rationalized hier-
archical lines that currently integrate them.” Id. at 326.
21. See  Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH . L. R EV. 694, 710 (1980) (“Under the cir-
cumstances, I take some pleasure, not however unmixed with regret, in noting that the Framers
would have understood the phenomenon that Professor Tribe’s work represents: [T]hey called
it corruption.” (reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)).
22. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Difference: White
Authority in the Legal Academy. 41 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1113 (1992).
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meetings, to construct a praxis which is meaningful, public, and danger-
ous.”23 Successful trashing mixes contempt with nihilism.
One of the primary objectives of LPC is to control the methodology
and substance of scholarship. The assumption is that the Liberal white
male establishment uses the doctrinal method to sustain the illusion of
objectivity, neutrality, and determinacy. The control of scholarship is a
critical avenue to the ultimate subversion of the Liberal establishment.
The strategy is to scorch the earth: attack the assumed certainty of line-
arity with deconstruction, 24 and replace the doctrinal model with the
narrative genre—storytelling, allegory, and parable. It is a maneuver that
makes genre a critically important indicia of LPC. For the LPC genre to
be effective it must expose the various nuances of oppression, describe
its psychologically debilitating effects, and transform, or at least educate,
the dominant culture. One of the more esteemed techniques is the use of
personal experiences to convey the emotion and agony of persevering in
an alien environment of patriarchy, hierarchy, and objectification.
Narrative is a genre with an eclectic agenda. Drucilla Cornell wrote a
play contrasting the distant autonomy and aloofness of the male char-
acter with the empathy and nurturing instincts of the female character,
who relies on “emotional logic.” 25 Another LPC writer strings a series of
“cynical,” “serious,” and “giddy” poems together as a preface to autobio-
graphical vignettes of sexism in legal education.26 Brenda Waugh ex-
poses the tyranny of big law firm practice in eighteen pages of doggerel,
striving to engage the reader “in a conversation between my words and
your memories.”27 Professor Jennifer M. Russell uses memoir to engage
in a self-catharsis to examine her feelings and frustrations over a racial
incident.28 Paulette Caldwell teases and trivializes linearity by pleading “I
want to know my hair again . . . .”29
LPC exalts obfuscated terminology and syntax. It comes from the de-
construction influence and is reflected in an affectation of Michael Fou-
cault’s description of Jacques Derrida’s prose style as “obscurantist ter-
rorism.”30 Deconstructionists feel an obligation—literally a duty—to
avoid lucidity and transparent language. Critic Raymond Tallis says:
“clarity is the enemy of writers whose stylistic mannerisms serve to cover
over difficult theoretical problems by making it hard to pin down just
                                                                                                                                                
23. David Fraser, If I Had a Rocket Launcher: Critical Legal Studies as Moral Terrorism,
41 H ASTINGS L.J . 777, 804 (1990).
24. For a discussion of the mischief that efforts at applying deconstruction to law cause
see AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 93-109.
25. Drucilla L. Cornell, The Dream Cure, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT L.J. 87, 90
(1991).
26. Heather R. Wishik, Reverie, 16 N. MEX. L. REV. 495, 495 (1986).
27. Brenda Waugh, A Theory of Employment Discrimination, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 113, 114
n.2 (1990).
28. See  Jennifer M. Russell, On Being a Gorilla in Your Midst, or, the Life of One Black
Woman in the Legal Academy, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 259 (1993).
29. Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender ,
1991 DUKE L. J.  365, 365 (1991).
30. DAVID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES  77 (1991).
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what they are saying.” 31 John Ellis identifies another consequence of ob-
scurantist terrorism—that it deflects crit icism “so that familiar positions
may not seem so familiar and otherwise obviously relevant scholarship
may not seem so obviously relevant.”32 Likewise, vagueness reinforces
the indeterminacy of language by decertainizing the text. Stanley Fish,
an English professor with a joint appointment at Duke Law School, ar-
gues: “The objectivity of the text is an illusion and, moreover, a danger-
ous illusion, because it is so physically convincing.”33
II.   THE TOP TEN
A.   Number One
The following Commentary is an unfinished work. Professor Frug
was working on this Commentary when she was murdered on April
4, 1991. The Editors of the Harvard Law Review agreed that, under
the circumstances, the preservation of Mary Joe Frug’s voice out-
weighed strict adherence to traditional editorial policy. For this rea-
son, neither stylistic nor organizational changes have been made,
and footnotes have been expanded but not added. [Editorial Board,
Harvard Law Review]34
Even in an uncompleted condition, A Postmodern Feminist Legal
Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft)35 is an obvious choice for Number One.
In addition to receiving premium scores in every evaluation category, the
Frug piece is the most controversial law review article ever published. Its
publication history is a bizarre story of unconfirmed suspicions, rumors,
and feminist implication.
Mary Joe Frug, a 49 year-old professor at New England School of
Law, was the wife of a well-known Crit Harvard law professor and the
co-founder, with Clare Dalton, of the Fem-Crit movement. She was
stabbed to death near her home in an exclusive section of Cambridge,
inflicted with five wounds in her chest and groin. The murderer has not
been apprehended and rumors over motive continue to circulate, in-
cluding the belief by some of her ardent supporters that she was targeted
by a patriarchal conspiracy. “Mary Joe Frug may be a martyr to the ran-
dom male violence toward females that she believed was rife in the
world.”36
                                                                                                                                                
31. Raymond Tallis, A Cure for Theorrhea , 3 CRITICAL REV. 7, 29 (1989) (reviewing J.G.
MERQUIOR, FROM PRAGUE TO PARIS: A CRITIQUE OF STRUCTURALIST AND POST-STRUCTURALIST
THOUGHT (1986)).
32. JOHN M. E LLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION 142 (1989).
33. STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 43 (1980). It was Fish who said that de-
construction “‘relieves me of the obligation to be right . . . and demands only that I be in terest-
ing.’“ LEHMAN, supra note 30, at 75 (quoting Stanley Fish).
34.  Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft) , 105
HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (1992).
35. See id.
36. David Warsh, What the Stories About Harvard Leave Out, BOSTON GLOBE, May 5,
1992, at 43. For discussion of the murder see Matthew Brelis, Law Professor’s Murder Still Un-
solved, BOSTON GLOBE, April 5, 1992, at 29; Peter Collier, Blood on the Charles , VANITY FAIR ,
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The decision to publish her manuscript was not unanimous, and after
its publication, a group of dissenters expressed their dismay in a parody
presented at the Harvard Law Review’s annual banquet. It was titled
He-Manifesto of Post-Mortem Legal Feminism with Frug identified as
the “Rigor-Mortis Professor of Law.”37 What ensued was an explosion of
LPC rhetoric.38 Faxes criss-crossed between feminists and Frug’s sup-
porters who demanded that the parodists be punished, and defenders of
the parodists like Alan Dershowitz complained about “‘a McCarthyite
witch hunt.’”39 Professor Elizabeth Bartholet’s reply: “‘this incident
shows something very scary about male anger toward women in this in-
stitution. . . . These people don’t get it.’”40 A colleague of Frug said: “They
engaged in a necrophiliac gang bang upon the living body of her work.”41
Frug’s discourse on the female body is a terrorist exercise in self-
flagellation. She describes the female body as existing “‘in terror’, a body
that has learned to scurry, to cringe, and to submit.”42 It cringes from the
culture of oppression created by a system that uses linguistic ploys to
render the female rapeable. The concussion level is off the LPC shock
chart. Frug cites Madonna, 43 Camille Paglia’s favorite sex icon, and then
moves on to the “F” and “C” words with such insights as: “In pornogra-
phy, women get fucked. Now, women get ‘fucked’ in the workplace, too,
where we do ‘women’s work’ for ‘women’s wages,’ working for male
bosses and working on male schedules . . . . We are raped at work or on
route to work because of our sex, because we are cunts.”44 She condemns
pornography for the valorization of the ejaculating penis.45
The use of the “F” and “C” words forced the dominant male system to
confront the most graphic effects of its oppression on the female body.
It’s a verbal kick to the establishment’s groin, a gesture which gained the
approval of Martha Minow who, writing in response to Frug’s article,
said: “I get a charge thinking about . . . certain four-letter words ap-
pearing in a law review.”46
An unfinished manuscript composed in a postmodern dialect consti-
tutes a distinctive type of oppositional genre to counter and subvert the
majoritarian doctrinal model. It was a scenario that enabled the Review’s
editors to convert the Unfinished Draft into a collective LPC effort by
publishing the responses of three fellow feminists to “complete some of
                                                                                                                                                
Oct. 1992, at 144; Alice McQuillan, The Professor and the Murder, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 29,
1992 at 7, available in 1992 WL 4052275.
37. Collier, supra note 36, at 155.
38. For discussions of the parody see Fox Butterfield, Parody Puts Harvard Law Faculty
in Sexism Battle, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 1992, at A10; Collier, supra note 36; David Margolick, At
The Bar, N.Y. TIMES , April 17, 1992, at B16; Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Rule of Nonsense at Har-
vard Law, LEGAL TIMES, June 1, 1992, at 25.
39. Butterfield, supra note 38 .
40. Id.
41. Collier, supra note 36, at 159.
42. Frug, supra note 34 , at 1049-50.
43. See  id.  at 1053.
44. Id. at 1072.
45. See id. at 1074.
46. Martha Minow, Incomplete Correspondence: An Unsent Letter to Mary Joe Frug, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1096, 1104 (1992).
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the thoughts that Professor Frug left unfinished.” 47 Barbara Johnson in-
terprets Frug as relying on both linear arguments and postmodernism to
advance feminism.48 The linear style flushes out patriarchal legal con-
structs used to oppress while postmodern indeterminacy operates “as a
kind of guerrilla warfare,” 49 leading the reader to a better understanding
of the conflicts among women. In a sisterhood trashing of Frug, Ruth
Colker produces a credible candidate for the LPC Top Ten list. Admitting
she had “no idea what Mary Joe intended to say,” she nevertheless en-
tered into a lesbian critique.50 Her complaint is that Frug’s essentialist
perspective failed to comprehend the impact of her ideas on the lesbian
lifestyle.51 Colker invokes LPC chic to give a brief autobiographical ac-
count of her bisexuality to dramatize lesbian terrorization under patriar-
chy. While her vocabulary is LPCized—“heterosexualize lesbians,”52—and
her syntax baffling,53 Colker needs more bite to break into the Top Ten.
By calling attention to Frug’s success in invoking deconstruction and
postmodernism, Martha Minow flushes out the obscurantist terrorism in
Unfinished Draft. LPC relies on these two critical constructs to provide
the intellectual rationale for subverting the certainty thesis of the Liberal
system. Deconstruction rejects the author’s authority over the text and
assumes that meaning is never fixed. Under the guardianship of Jacques
Derrida, the objective is to undress and demystify the duplicity of the
text. Meaning is both “‘differential’ and ‘deferred’, the product of a rest-
less play within language that cannot be fixed or pinned down for the
purposes of conceptual definition.” 54 The deconstructionist is someone
who gazes into the abyss of meaning and comes away smiling.55
Postmodernism radicalizes deconstruction. If deconstruction de-
stroys meaning and text, postmodernism spreads chaos. It disorients,
attacks coherence and liberates the audience from the hierarchy of high
and low forms of culture. Reality “is unordered and ultimately unknow-
                                                                                                                                                
47. Frug, supra note 34 , at 1045.
48. See  Barbara Johnson, The Postmodern in Feminism, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1076, 1077-78
(1992).
49. Id. at 1078.
50. Ruth Colker, The Example of Lesbians: A Posthumous Reply to Professor Mary Joe
Frug, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1084 (1992).
51. Id. at 1085-86.
An anti-essentialist perspective reveals that many of the rules that Professor Frug
describes as having a negative sexualizing, maternalizing, or terrorizing effect on
some heterosexual women have an enhanced or different effect on lesbians In some
instances, these rules have a similar effect on lesbians and heterosexual women; in
others, the effect may be detrimental to heterosexual women, yet it may improve
the lives of some lesbians.
Id.
52. Id. at 1088 (“Although prostitution rules may not heterosexualize lesbians, other rules
may.”).
53. See id.  at 1095 n.52 (“Professor Frug attempted to write a ‘localized disrup tion’ rather
than a total theory. She seems to have been influenced by Catharine Mackinnon’s work al-
though MacKinnon attempts to formulate a ‘total theory’ rather than a localized disrup tion.”)
(citations omitted).
54. CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, DERRIDA  15 (1987).
55. This is a critic’s description of Paul deMan who was admired as “‘the only man who
ever looked into the abyss [of deconstruction] and came away smiling.’” LEHMAN, supra note
30, at 156.
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able.”56 Knowledge comes from the totality of cultural experience and in-
cludes multiplicity, plurality, fragmentation, and indeterminacy. Andy
Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup can is art just as much as a Gaugnin. “A
postmodernist thus calls for new categories, modes of thought and writ-
ing, and values and politics to overcome the deficiencies of modern dis-
courses and practices.”57
Engaging in word free-play that infuriates the Liberal wing is a self-
appointed franchise. Committed to analysis and neutrality according to
the linear methodology, Liberals are forced to endure the torture of LPC
word terrorism. On the Liberal infuriation meter, with “10” being the
highest score, Unfinished Draft  gets a “10+.” Frug’s description of post-
modernism is the “plus.” First we learn that postmodernism may be
“passé” but used to be “genius”: “Once that initial moment has passed,
there’s not much value in what’s left over.”58 What is left over reminds
her of “female troubles—of premenstrual and postmenopausal blues.”59
For postmodernism, sometimes the medium is the message in a style of
irony and “wordplay that is often dazzlingly funny, smart, and irrever-
ent. Things aren’t just what they seem.”60 Despite the possibility that
postmodernism’s freelancing style speaks in a multiplicity of voices that
could blur and fragment the message of feminist scholarship, Frug posits
that postmodernism is not politically incorrect. It can open new visions,
and at least, “the oppositional character of the style arguably coincides
with the oppositional spirit of feminism.”61 Her postmodernist conclu-
sion: “only when the word ‘woman’ cannot be coherently understood,
will oppression by sex be fatally undermined.”62
B.   Number Two
I hope that the gaps in my own writing will be self-consciously filled
by the reader, as an act of forced mirroring of meaning-invention.
To this end, I exploit all sorts of literary devices, including parody,
parable, and poetry.63
But for An Unfinished Draft, Patricia Williams would secure first
place. It is close—a snakeskin margin puts her behind Frug. Williams’s
supporters may dispute my choice of article to serve as exemplar. They
would expect the Benetton narrative which begins with the famous line:
“Buzzers are big in New York City”64 and is the story of the author’s
seething anger at being denied entrance to a trendy clothing store by “[a]
narrow-eyed, white teenager wearing running shoes and feasting on
                                                                                                                                                
56. STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY: CRITICAL INTERROGATIONS 9
(1991).
57. Id. at 30.
58. Frug, supra note 34 , at 1045.
59. Id. at 1046.
60. Id. at 1047.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1075.
63. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS , THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND R IGHTS  8 (1991).
64. Id. at 44.
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bubble gum”65 to take first place. Benetton is the most esteemed Critical
Race narrative. The problem in recognizing Benetton as the second
choice is that there are a series of Benetton stories.66 The first is a short
two and one-half page version of the exclusion incident.67 This was fol-
lowed by frequent repetitions in speaking engagements that were ulti-
mately published with embellishments in a chapter in The Alchemy of
Race and Rights. Since the book chapter narrative is not eligible as a law
review article and the law review story is too inchoate for consideration,
I turn to another Williams narrative: Com mercial Rights and Constitu-
tional Wrongs.68
Williams specializes in emotionalized introspection, is dedicated to
journal keeping, enjoys television’s dysfunctionalism, loves to shop, is
constantly annoyed with spoiled students, and broods over newspaper
copy. She is fond of creating faceless and vacuous characters to expose
the callous Liberal white hierarchy. The “self” dominates her plots. “I am
sitting on a train writing a speech for a program sponsored by the Uni-
versity of Maryland School of Law.”69 As she muses over the unspecified
evasions of private contract law, she is joined by a stockbroker, and en-
gages in a conversation about the homeless.70 This is the Williams
trademark—a series of encounters between the perceptive self of Wil-
liams and a misguided symbol of oppression or insensitivity. The stock-
broker is an Ivan Boesky “greed is healthy”71 capitalist; he talks to, but
does not tip, the homeless in his neighborhood to remind himself that
“they’re not just animals.”72
As the acknowledged genius of LPC postmodernism, Williams never
allows the reader to gain control of the text. The scenes constantly shift,
forcing the audience to constantly refocus, confront new instances of op-
pression, and reconsider the implications of previous parts of the story.
The stockbroker scene is followed by accounts of Williams preparing for
a conference while musing over homelessness as a legacy of slavery,
teaching a two-session course on homelessness and law at another
school during which she mentions Mayor Koch putting up subway signs
discouraging riders from giving to panhandlers (“bad for tourism”), 73
remembers an article about a homeless pregnant woman giving birth on
a New York subway,74 recalls a series of bad encounters with her stu-
dents who resent her constant references to the homeless and “growl
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with the restless urge to go shopping,”75 and ponders on a meeting with
the dean who has received complaints from the students about her sub-
way stories.76
Her students’ reactions to stories from the bottom is the metaphor for
the Liberal culture’s persistent denial of the truth of oppression. When
they ignore her description of beggar women and assorted subway bums,
and tell her that “this is the land of opportunity and that anyone who
works hard can get anything they want,”77 they, like their elitist profes-
sors, perpetuate the “fictional visions” 78 of a white supremacist democ-
racy. It is the naive cream-puff questions by her students that enable
Williams to unmask the cynical veneer of capitalism.
Conditioned to rational analysis, objectivity and the linear style, doc-
trinalists cannot cope with the Williams routine. To critics, her syntax is
overly pretentious and opaque. In explaining her topic, Williams says:
“At issue is a structure of relation in which a cultural code has been in-
scribed; if I am inside the bell jar of this common culture, my dilemma
becomes how I can situate myself in order to evaluate it.”79 This pot-
pourri of self-indulgent babbling about babbling technique defies trans-
lation and exasperates critics. Her “idiosyncratic approach” has been
compared to “new-age performance art,”80 “obscured by pop jargon and
personal irrelevancies.”81 Her parables rebuff debate: “How can you re-
spond critically? Tell a different story of your own?”82 A law professor
accuses her of relying on “overblown and overwrought prose, lurching
between the perplexing and the obfuscatory, the melodramatic and the
grandiose . . . . ”83 What bothers critics the most is Williams’s suffocating,
autobiographical, emotional narratives. Wendy Kaminer’s reaction is
typical: “The first person invites us in but the language shuts us out, and
her diary finally seem less personal than private, self-enclosed.”84 Other
more succinct critics like Richard Posner accuse Williams of “blurring . .
. the line between fiction and truth.”85 Jonathan Rieder asks: “Is she dis-
covering subtle aspects of racism, or is she imagining them?”86
Williams and her Critical Race colleagues welcome criticism from the
dominant Liberal majority; it validates the authenticity of the voice the-
sis by acknowledging an inability to comprehend the agonies of oppres-
sion. This explains Williams’s frustration over Jonathan Rieder’s fault-
finding review: “Mr. Rieder’s reading is a perfect example of why I am so
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critical of those deadly conventions of scholarship that never look up to
see that there might be worlds of meaning beyond the safe burrow of
one’s own genre—or of one’s own neighborhood.”87
The most threatening criticism of Williams’s storytelling is that it de-
fies verification. This is the type of barrier that drives verification and
Bluebook addicted doctrinalists crazy. They see it as the subversion of
the truth standard. How do you know that Williams had the various ex-
changes with the dean and the angry students, or the stockbroker en-
counter? Even Williams acknowledged rumors about the truthfulness of
the Benetton story.88 Posner criticizes her for a discussion of the Tawana
Brawley incident without mentioning that it was a hoax with devastating
consequences. 89 Farber and Sherry criticize Williams—and the storytel-
ling movement—for a “casualness about truth”90 and Coughlin has a
“nagging ambivalence over the truth”91 of the sausage story.92
Their concern is justified and mandatory for anyone who adheres to
the doctrinal model of scholarship but is nevertheless i rrelevant to voice
narration. Williams’s stories express the reality of the totality of the
Black experience—from slavery through the tyranny of spirit-murder. To
attack her truthfulness in telling the Black experience is another mani-
festation of the dominant culture’s rejection of “Blackness.” Replying to
the rumors about the Benetton story, Williams explains:
At this point I realized it almost didn’t make any difference whether I
was telling the truth or not—that the greater issue I had to face was
the overwhelming weight of a disbelief that goes beyond mere disin-
clination to believe and becomes active suppression of anything I
might have to say. The greater problem is a powerfully oppressive
mechanism for denial of black self-knowledge and expression.93
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Williams is esteemed by LPC for transformative and authentic voice
narration. The voice thesis assumes that centuries of subordination im-
bues people of color with a distinctive vision of suffering and the capac-
ity to describe the experiences of oppression.94 Moreover, the dominant
white culture does not have standing to question the authority of voice
stories. Alex Johnson, Jr. summarizes: “[T]he voice of color is identified
and synonymous with marginalized groups in our society whose mar-
ginal outsider status enables them to relate important stories—stories
that cannot be sincerely told by their privileged majoritarian peers.”95
Williams’s autobiographical stories have played a major role in ren-
dering the doctrinal model irrelevant to a new generation of students
and academics. She, along with Derrick Bell and Richard Delgado, have
created a public intellectual audience and in the process introduced sto-
rytelling as an acceptable academic exercise. Her position on the Colum-
bia Law School faculty furnishes the imprimatur from an elite institution
for the credibility of her work. Her achievement is the production of a
Black-female perspective that merges victimization and advocacy to
marginalize the Liberal white establishment. To admirers like Robin
West, her work demonstrates that “reading can be transformative, and
that writing sometimes can be and should always strive to be a moral act
of the highest order.”96 The highest LPC accolade comes from Henry
Louis Gates, Jr.: “Williams manages to cause no end of trouble.”97
C.   Number Three
This idea of female marines? It’s a bunch of bull, man. They cause
trouble and they can’t do the work. It’s why we call recruits girls.98
Feminists have traditionally viewed the military as the most incorri-
gible and ruthless citadel of patriarchy. Their antagonism is supported
by the Radical Left who accuse the military of being willing lackeys for
the capitalist-imperialist conspiracy. Electing a president with an ad-
mitted loathing for the armed services was the signal for the engendering
of the citadel. Popular media accounts suggest that feminization of the
military is in progress.99 Madeline Morris’s By Force of Arms: Rape,
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War, and Military Culture 100 is a participant and an influence in the
feminization movement.
Morris attacks the central nervous system of the military. She wants
to take kill and maim out of combat, and goes on the offensive by in-
voking what feminists consider the most heinous crime—rape—as the
justification for her pacification sociology. Her survey indicates that in
peacetime, military rape rates are lower than civilian; in times of com-
bat, however, the military rate doubles the civilian rate. “Thus, in both
the wartime and the peacetime contexts studied, a rape differential ex-
ists: The ratio of military rape rates to civilian rape rates is substantially
larger than the ratio of military rates to civilian rates of other violent
crimes.”101
Effective LPC scholarship demonizes—it uncovers and profiles a Lib-
eral demon and then rips it apart. The demon is military culture—a de-
mon synonymous with other evils like fraternities, street gangs, and
sports teams.102 The military culture encourages male bonding, imposes
discipline, develops the warrior spirit, focuses on toughness, self suffi-
ciency, and dominancy, and preaches a “kill the enemy” message creat-
ing a masculine culture with norms celebrated in combat tradition but
conducive to rape. Masculinity is the evil spirit of the military culture:
“In essence, normative standards of masculinity that emphasize aggres-
siveness, dominance, and independence, and that minimize sensitivity,
gentleness, and other stereotypically feminine characteristics have been
found to be associated with heightened propensity to commit rape.”103
Morris’s solution to the rape problem is to castrate the military cul-
ture by removing the testosterone from the masculine demons. Feminize
the ranks by permitting females into all work stations, including combat,
recruit more women, and fully integrate basic training. An enhanced fe-
male presence “would be inconsistent with a military culture in which
women are viewed as the ‘other,’ primarily as sexual targets, and in
which aggression is viewed as a sign of masculinity.”104
The ultimate goal is the decimation of what Morris calls the “mascu-
linist”105 attitude. Give compassion and understanding status as military
norms. Replace macho posturing with a vision of the just warrior, “pro-
tecting democracy and the decent lives of decent people.”106 Change the
ideology from aggression and dominance—the kill mentality—to “ideal-
ism and moral conviction.”107 The military should emulate “religious or-
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ders, Communist Party cells, the French resistance underground, and
even Alcoholics Anonymous.”108
If timing counted, By Force of Arms would be ranked number one.
Its appearance coincided with the allegation of sexual misconduct at the
Army’s Aberdeen Proving Grounds and helped to qualify Morris as an
expert on military sex crimes.109 The article was an immediate quick read
for feminists and the military. As a public intellectual, she carried her
campaign against masculinity to the media. Speaking of Aberdeen, Mor-
ris posited: “This is not some aberrant individual doing an isolated act . .
. it’s part and parcel of the way the military has structured its views on . .
. what it means to be a man.”110 Then, in what must have been an an-
noying twist to the Colonel Blimps, Morris was invited into the military’s
fort to serve as a consultant on gender issues to Togo West, the Secretary
of the Army.
From then on Morris was operating in the center of a national con-
troversy. At every level, the military was in chaos, adrift in downsizing,
budget cuts, and trying to adjust to a post-cold war period.111 They have
the responsibility to police the world with a depleted corps that is forty
percent less than it was seven years ago. “The U.S. now offers the world a
grand strategy that is, in essence, a gigantic bluff.” 112 Critics argue that
feminization contributes to the bluff effect. The pressure to satisfy quo-
tas for an all-volunteer corp forces an increase in the number of female
recruits. To attract women and reduce attrition, the training process has
been softened. Recruits now wear sneakers instead of combat boots, gym
shorts instead of fatigues, and are allowed to run around, not over, the
obstacle (now called confidence) course.113 Drill sergeants, now kinder
and gentler, do not cuss or otherwise humiliate recruits.114 Basic training
is “more like summer camp.”115 Hence, not only are the armed forces un-
dermanned, but they are wimps who, by their own assessment, “don’t
know how to fight.”116
For her demonization of the military culture, Morris became an icon
to LPC and a pariah to militarists. Comparing her to Clausewitz for the
bold audacity of her attack, the Washington Times editorialized that
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“her theories as to the causes of the ‘rape differential’ are outdone in ec-
centricity only by her remedies, which are downright bizarre.”117 Hanna
Rosin, in the liberal New Republic, observed that “the military is not a
faculty lounge” while wondering how the “U.S. wound up in the bra-
burning territory.” 118 Morris was accused of being one of the anti-military
feminists who was diverting the services from war capacity to “bizarre
policies,”119 and her article represented “the logical, if lunatic, extrapola-
tion of personnel and training policies with which the U.S. military has
been trying to appease feminist demands.”120 The toughest counter came
from Elaine Donnelly who cites Morris’s lack of empirical evidence and
concluded: “The entire article might be dismissed as inconsequential as
well as fatuous, except that her ideological theories might become official
policy through Secretary West . . . . ”121
LPC scholarship seeks notoriety and By Force of Arms delivered like
a Patsy Cline song in a Texas honkytonk. Morris was on the opposite end
of the Nancy Kassebaum Baker committee’s recommendation to segre-
gate the sexes in basic training but supported by a Pentagon conclusion
that gender integration fostered a positive attitude.122 Attention shifted
to Sara Lister, Assistant Secretary of the Army, who was quoted:
[T]he Marines are extremists. Wherever you have extremists . . .
you’ve got some risks of total disconnection with society, and that’s a
little dangerous. I think the Army is much more connected to society
than the Marines are . . . . The Marine Corps is—you know, they have
all those checkerboard fancy uniforms and stuff. But the Army is sort
of muddy boots on the ground.123
She proffered an apology that echoes By Force of Arms by putting the
blame on culture: “[M]y point—ineptly put—was that all the services had
different relationships with civilian society, based in part on their cul-
ture, the size of their force and their mission . . . .”124
Morris has helped to convert the word masculinity into an Orwellian
Newspeak term connoting sexual predation. Supported by sex escapades
in the ranks, she composed what Hanna Rosin calls the storyline: “[T]he
entire military is an alien, retrograde institution, conspiring against
feminist concerns.”125 She ambitiously seeks to redefine the most mascu-
line paradigm—the warrior—into an engendered person who is compas-
sionate, nurturing, just, and programmed to kill only “bad” opponents.
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By Force of Arms  is number three for another reason—it does not
deal with law, instead it is a story about the sociology and ideology of
radical feminism. Rape is not analyzed as a legal problem but is pre-
sented as the inevitable consequence of a masculinist culture. She relies
on the accepted LPC Newspeak social construct thesis to define the just
warrior as a combination of Communist cell and Alcoholics Anony-
mous.126 It was, as they used to say on the rifle range, “lock and load.”
Morris did just that and threw a grenade into the citadel, akin to a head-
line announcing Andrea Dworkin and Catharine Mackinnon Join the
Army.
 D.   Number Four
The critical legal studies movement has undermined the central
ideas of modern legal thought . . . . 127
The movement completely collapsed several years ago . . . CLS is
dead as a doornail.128
There was a time when the Crits were the lead players in the LPC
movement. As refugees from the counterculture rebellion of the 1960s
they introduced radical politics into what had been an insulated law
academy. It was an elitist group teaching revolution at prestigious
schools, affecting the proletariat look in class before getting in BMWs to
drive home to enjoy a glass of wine and toast the struggle against hierar-
chy and privilege. The Dean of Harvard accused the CLS movement of
engaging in a “ritual slaying of the elders.”129 The Crits viewed law as an
exercise in class, gender, and race oppression that hid behind false ob-
jectivity to maintain the status quo of patriarchy. They saw decisions,
laws, and regulations as a form of indeterminate literature. To a Crit, in-
determinacy means that there “are as many plausible readings of the
United States Constitution as there are versions of Hamlet” . . . . ”130
Written by Duncan Kennedy and Peter Gabel, Roll Over Beethoven131
is an open window to CLS mentality. The authors are original Crits, part
of the group that met in the summer of 1977 in Madison, Wisconsin to
jump-start the movement.132 Kennedy, revered among Crits as a “cross
between Rasputin and Billy Graham”133 and a self-described “existential-
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Marxist anarcho-syndicalist modernist,”134 infuriated the liberals at Har-
vard by recommending that everyone—including janitors—be paid the
same salary.135 His co-author, Peter Gabel, may be less flamboyant but
was equally dedicated to the revolution. His holy grail was the duplica-
tion of Consciousness III from Reich’s The Greening of America136 he
says “I was much more sex, drugs, rock and roll, revolution, break
through the facade of the system to get to immediate connection . . . .”137
Their opaque styles personified the tensions that ultimately led to the
demise of the movement.138
Here is a synopsis of the rap session they titled Roll Over Beethoven.
They agree on the need for structural reformulation. Kennedy accuses
Gabel of betraying the cause by seeking unity. No, Gabel wants unalien-
ated relatedness. Kennedy rejects that explanation as “abstract bullshit,”
comparing abstract formulation to speculation about reincarnation.
Kennedy notes that intersubjective zap is possible and accuses Gabel of
talking “rationalist, formulae, positivist yuk.” Gabel brags about using
intersubjective zap countless times. Kennedy says that Gabel is guilty of
explicitness and that body-snatchers are lurking, ready to turn explicit-
ness into a cluster of pods. Gabel connects Kennedy’s proposal that
janitors teach at law schools with intersubjective zap. 139 Kennedy delivers
a short lecture praising the interspace of artifacts, gestures, histrionics,
soap opera, pop culture, and “all that kind of stuff.” Gabel complains that
intersubjective zap is falsified when it falls into the hands of body-
snatchers. Kennedy posits that jokes can be used to protect the reality of
the community. Gabel disagrees. When Gabel criticizes him for evading
explicitness, Kennedy wants to know how to reconcile that criticism with
his proposal that janitors receive equal pay and his no-hassle pass pro-
posal. At this point, Gabel unloads on the fundamental contradiction,
arguing that it is being appropriated by the body-snatching rights theo-
rists who use it as a pod for self-serving objectives. Kennedy goes ballis-
tic, saying he renounces the fundamental contradiction. “I recant it, and
I also recant the whole idea of individualism and altruism . . . . I mean
these things are absolutely classic examples of ‘philosophical’ abstrac-
tions which you can manipulate into little structures.”140 Kennedy threat-
ens to recant his critique of rights noting that rights analysis is a way of
imagining the world and we don’t know much about the world. Kennedy
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goes into rights and hallucinations, telling Gabel that “we’re all halluci-
nating, all the time.” And on it goes, with Gabel noting near the end:
“That I think is indeterminate.”141 Kennedy wistfully concludes that the
CLS movement is in a tough political war and “it looks like it’s trench
warfare for decades.”142
To the Crits trashing is a ritual. It enables them to ridicule the Lib-
eral’s commitment to analysis and objectivity. While much of Crit
trashing143 is sordid or silly, Roll Over is Crit chic. At the entry level it
mocks the Liberal mentality. According to Kennedy:
People are what they are in the mode of not being what they are, so
that if you want to understand what it is to be a person, you have to be
open to experience the negation that’s at the very core of your own
being, and of the being of everyone else.144
Gabel trashes the gang of Liberals and feminists who seek rights, label-
ing them hallucinates who co-opt themselves into “adopting the very
consciousness they want to transform.”145 When Kennedy protests, Gabel
reminds him of another Crit target—the Supreme Court—whose opin-
ions “generates a fantasy-based ideological framework about the nature
of social reality.”146
The principal trashee is the state—“the state as a collective hallucina-
tion.”147 Gabel and Duncan the Doughnut revisit The Greening of Amer-
ica to complain about the absence of reciprocity among people, the state
as an aspect of unconnectedness, as an imaginary political community,
composed of a “sequence of images forming a kind of dream-like narra-
tive that mystifies and idealizes the painful reality of immediate social
experience—the real experience corroded by alienation and mutual dis-
tance.”148
As trashing, Roll Over is a form of postmodern performance art—a
blend of indeterminacy and chaos. It is a version of Karen Finley ranting
and raging “about the evils of the day,”149 an “extended exhibitionistic
frenzy of victimization and self-pity.”150 Like Finley, their work “is punc-
tuated throughout with acts of self-sabotage.”151 Categorizing their per-
formance art depends on the reader’s deconstruction—my first impres-
sion was that the two Crits were acting out an outlaw role by metaphori-
cally rubbing feces on the faces of the readers. After reflection, I con-
cluded that Roll Over anticipated Live Painting, in which artists covered
themselves with car paint and hang for hours on hooks, talking or star-
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146. Id. at 27.
147. Id. at 28.
148. Id. at 35.
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ing at onlookers. The idea is to challenge the traditional view of art,
which assumes the viewer can read any type of criticism into the work.
Live Painting permits the artist to look critically at the (reader) viewer,
even to harass him. “Words drifted out unconnected” [from a Live
Painting at a New York exhibit]. “If you hooked them all together, they
made their kind of sense. “It’s all part of the piece, it’s funny, and it’s
threatening.”152
Crits carefully nurtured scorn for Liberal scholarship and the doc-
trinal style. Mimicking the Derridian deconstructionalists they produced
incoherent, dense, and impenetrable scholarship. This is not the result of
a lack of composition skills but instead a function of CLS strategy. The
objective is the calculated use of a private Critspeak jargon to intimidate
the Liberal community. They compound the problem for Liberals by
giving code words like praxis double meanings. Gabel and Kennedy rely
on Co nsciousness III metaphors like intersubjective zap, a term with
psychedelic connotations which means “a vitalizing moment of energy
(hence “zap”) when the barriers between the self and the other are in
some sense suddenly dissolved.”153 Body snatchers is another favorite;
taken from the film Invasion of the Body Snatchers  it refers to Liberals
who appropriate Crit ideas, distorting them for their own devious pur-
poses. “Like one of the pod-bodies in Invasion of the Body Snatchers, an
appropriated phrase loses some of its original meaning and sense of
historical contingency.”154 It was fun mocking the establishment while
playing the role of the political revolutionary, bragging at the yearly
conferences that “when they find out what we’re doing, they’re going to
come after us with guns.”155
E.   Number Five
Derek Bok was not pleased. So we went to meet with him. And he
said, “What were you trying to do?” And I said: “We were trying to
help you get this affirmative action thing up on the agenda for dis-
cussion.” And he said: “Well, you don’t have to blow me up.” Kind of
missed the whole point.156
In Faces at the Bottom of the Well157 Derrick Bell quotes an older civil
rights worker in Mississippi who was asked what kept her going in dan-
gerous times. She replied: “I lives to harass white folks.”158 And this is
what Bell did in the allegorical Final Report,159 harassing President
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Derek Bok of Harvard and the white male academy with a tough mes-
sage.
In a shock allegory Bell leads with an “earth-shaking explosion” that
kills the President of Harvard and every one of the Black professors and
administrators employed by the school. Bok had convened a meeting to
discuss complaints about Harvard’s moribund affirmative action pro-
gram. Documents and tapes discovered in the rubble recorded a pro-
found concern by Blacks over what they viewed as hiring tokenism and
the rejection of nontraditional scholarship for promotion and tenure. “As
a r esult, the selection process favors blacks who reject or minimize their
blackness, exhibit little empathy for or interest in black students, and
express views on racial issues that are far removed from positions held
by most blacks . . . .”160
If Patricia Williams is the poet laureate of voice narrative, Derrick
Bell is the movement’s godfather. By publishing The Civil Rights
Chronicles161 in the Harvard Law Review in 1985, Bell gave storytelling
instant respectability.162 In a narrative between the fictional civil rights
activist Geneva Crenshaw and a friend (Bell) he laid out his thesis that
when given a choice between redemption and racism the white culture
inevitably opts for the latter. Bell is revered by the Critical Race people:
“I have noticed in myself, for example, an immediate reaction of rage
when someone tells me they did not like the Civil Rights Chronicles.”163
Bell is one of God’s litigators—a preacher—and the Final Report is in
classic sermon style.164 He opens with the fire and brimstone of a nu-
clear-like explosion to rivet the audience’s attention. Then comes the
familiar revelation of sin and oppression: the white male Liberal ma-
joritarians maintaining the corrupt status quo by resorting to false and
self-serving hiring and promotion standards. In addition to the hegem-
ony of white male satans, Bell targets Black co-conspirators who think
white. On a tape recovered after the explosion we get a Randall Kennedy
message of meritocratic elitism: “there are very few blacks out there
qualified for professional teaching . . . .”165 The professor, caught in the
clutches of the white male Tyranny of Objectivity, pompously says to a
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colleague: “Ramona, protests are not appropriate for persons in an aca-
demic setting.”166
What gives Final Report  an edge over other narratives is its distinc-
tive technique: a blend of allegory and real events. While published as an
allegory it was in fact the actual document presented to Bok as a report
on minority policy—a commingling of fact and fiction.167 He blurs the
line between fact and fiction with a hate speech letter from a Harvard
graduate—then mentions in a footnote that a search of alumni records
failed to turn up the graduate.168 There is an additional layer of the real
world in footnote references to various documents describing what Bell
offers as proof of Harvard’s resistance to minority hiring. Bell supplies a
final layer of perspective with various memoranda explaining the pur-
pose of the report, along with support and criticism.
After blowing Derek Bok into smithereens, Bell concludes with a let-
ter to Catharine MacKinnon who, with an author’s discretion, he installs
as the new dean at Michigan. In accepting her offer to join the Michigan
faculty, Bell lays some heavy trashing on Harvard’s “Caucasian elit-
ism.”169 While Michigan “has become a very exciting institution”170 with a
faculty composed of more than fifty percent minorities, Harvard will
have none after Bell’s departure.171 When Michigan was confronted with
a crisis,172 they adopted nontraditional hiring criteria; Harvard did
not—a failure Bell blames on Bok’s treating his fictional tragedy as her-
esy.173
Bell is one of the more pessimistic storytellers. The dominant mes-
sage in his sermons is that Black people will never achieve full equality.
The Final Report introduced the crisis theme—nothing will change
without an explosion. “Our report was intended to find contemporary
relevance in the historic fact that major racial progress has always come
in periods of great crisis . . . .”174 Even with a crisis, any gain will be mod-
est. While the white system may make a concession, it will invariably
turn out to be a trick to camouflage some new form of oppression.
Storytellers favor the use of strawmen characters to manipulate the
narrative. In The Civil Rights Chronicles it was Bell as the narrator who
played the role of an earnest mentee seeking wisdom from Geneva Cren-
shaw. In Final Report it is the Randall Kennedy clone as a strawman for
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Blacks who deny their black authenticity, thereby subsidizing racial
marginalization. Likewise, Bell is a genius in twisting oppositional criti-
cism into evidence of racism. In a letter to the deans Bell summarizes
Bok’s review of criticism of the Report:175 most of the faculty were
“turned off,” the use of a fictional tragedy was proof that “we were not
serious,” and many faculty “were angered that the report questioned
[their] commitment to affirmative action.”176 This provides an opportu-
nity for vigorous rebuttal and to emphasize the contrast between the se-
rious effort by the Bell group to resolve an untenable injustice with the
arrogant disdain of the Liberal Caucasian elitists.
“I have,” Bell said in 1996, “managed a metamorphosis into one of the
‘new, black, public intellectuals.’”177 Final Report was a critical energizer
in the metamorphosis. In the national media attention that the fictional
killing of Bok received, Bell got the opportunity to exalt the virtues of
storytelling. “It’s a well-known African tradition to make a point using
stories, and we hope it will prevent our report from being forgotten.”178
Transferring the storytelling fashion from the parochial confines of the
academy to the public intellectual circuit was a significant boost for
movement. In the 1990s the Black public intellectual movement surfaced
as the dominant voice on race. People like Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Cor-
nell West, Stephen Carter, and Randall Kennedy, used op-ed pieces,
popular magazines, and TV, to build a broad audience base.179 It is a
form of scholarship with a social purpose. “[T]he new black intellectuals
have achieved a level of recognition usually reserved for near-emeritus
figures with numerous books behind them and a few years ahead.”180
Derrick Bell’s emergence as a Black public intellectual injected storytel-
ling into the national debate, sparking controversy and recognition. He
opened the door for other storytellers such as Richard Delgado.
F.   Number Six
The debate is about voice . . . about making everybody speak one
language. . . . The whole idea of the dominant legal discourse is to
limit the range of what you can express, the range of argument you
can make.181
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This is Richard Delgado’s complaint about the Empire, the confed-
eration of Liberal white males who govern legal education. Delgado
complains that since the inception of the Socratic Method and the scien-
tific model of legal analysis the Empire has used doctrinal scholarship to
privilege pseudo objectivity and censor dissent from minorities and
women. As a counter, Delgado seeks to subvert the doctrinal tyranny
with parables about minority experiences.
If Bell got a foot in the mainstream law review door with Chronicles,
Delgado broke the door down by persuading the Michigan Law Review
to publish a symposium on Legal Storytelling .182 The symposium certi-
fied the narrative genre as a legitimate threat to the doctrinal method.183
Williams introduced her now famous sausage machine metaphor,184
Bell’s Final Report appeared,185 while Delgado concluded the trilogy with
a series of parables on race exclusion in faculty hiring.186 It was the
opening salvo in the storytellers attack on the Empire.
Delgado fires a barrage of rockets through Rodrigo Crenshaw, a
graduate of a foreign law school whose mother is Italian and father
Black. He is also the brother of Bell’s Geneva Crenshaw. Rodrigo appears
in a series of parables to confront the old Professor (a wise Bell-like
character) with a problem dealing with race or gender.187 Delgado under-
stands—and exploits—the full range of advocacy resources that the par-
able technique provides. As a fictional tale to illustrate a lesson,188 it is an
invitation for generalization, counterstory, and assumptions not subject
to verification or analytical support. As a strawman, the old Professor’s
sole role is to praise Rodrigo for his sagacity and caution him for im-
petuosity.
Because it introduced and verified the talent of the parable-chronicle
methodology for LPC legerdemain, Rodrigo’s Chronicle,189 Delgado’s
first chronicle, is Number Six. Ostensibly a review of Dinesh D’Souza’s
controversial Illiberal Education,190 it is instead a counterstory about the
corruption and demise of that which D’Souza praises—Western culture.
Rodrigo is after Northern Europeans who “have accomplished lit-
tle—except causing a significant number of deaths and the disruption of
a number of more peaceful cultures, which they conquered, enslaved,
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exterminated, or relocated on their way to empire.”191 The old Professor
is intrigued by Rodrigo’s earnest and shrewd retelling of history.
Rodrigo has made a career of making unpredictable and culturally
sensitive assumptions and deductions, a habit he init iated in the first
Chronicle. He starts with the proposition that the Europeans are respon-
sible for developing linear thought, enabling them to industrialize and
produce weapons which they used to dominate other cultures.192 It is a
linear thought system out of control, causing economic chaos and pro-
ducing “a ruthless, restless culture” that “enslaved others, and removed
the Indians.”193 Worst of all, “Saxons developed the hundred-page linear,
densely footnoted, impeccably crafted article—saying, in most cases, very
little.”194 While Rodrigo admits he cannot prove that linear thought peo-
ple are genetically inferior he nevertheless concludes “they act like lem-
mings.”195
The plot has Rodrigo challenging the majoritarian cultural bias when
he seeks admission to an American LL.M. program as a preface to seek-
ing a teaching job. He indignantly rejects the credibility of the LSAT, ar-
guing that it rationalizes a grading system that unfairly awards the
dominant hegemony with “pervasive forms of cultural power.”196 Even if
he gets an LL.M. Rodrigo despairs of getting a job—Geneva has briefed
him on Bell’s views on the dominant culture’s use of merit to exclude
minorities and the tipping point phenomenon that puts a cap on a mi-
nority hiring.197
The story concludes with Rodrigo turning D’Souza’s argument that
education is being subverted by Political Correctness on its head.
Through greed, economic exploitation, and oppression the dominant
culture is in irreversible decline. In their state of denial, Liberals strike
out at the very victims of their oppression—as exemplified by D’Souza’s
book. Rodrigo’s solution and revenge: to survive, the majoritarians must
embrace the teaching of LPC. If they don’t, Rodrigo would speed things
up with a dose of sabotage or terrorism.198
LPC endorses the politicization of footnotes to marginalize the privi-
leged and to embellish the message.199 No one does it more effectively
than Delgado who frequently creates sub-plots in the barking at the
bottom of the page. His favorite tactic is the after-thought technique that
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has the old Professor making silent side remarks to himself: “I was re-
minded,” “I thought of,” “I was thinking,” or “perhaps Rodrigo was
thinking,” followed by praise of Critical Race ideology, condemnation of
the dominant culture or a new story.200 On occasion, he will gently ques-
tion Rodrigo’s judgment: “Only two weeks ago I had my car rebuilt by a
mechanic who (I hope) was well versed in linear thought.” 201
In 1984 Delgado wrote about the Imperial Scholar as part of a group
of liberal white male scholars who controlled civil rights scholarship by
not citing the work of minorities while cross-citing each other.202 Eight
years later he revisited the Imperial Scholar and concluded that while
minorities were publishing in the top journals, a new generation of “neo-
imperialist scholars” had moved in, employing “an almost baroque vari-
ety of ways to minimize, marginalize, co-op, soften, miss the point of se-
lectively ignore, or generally devalue the new insurgent writers.”203
The Imperial Scholar characterization nurtures the outsider pose by
charging the majoritarians with exclusion and footnote victimization. It
also deflects attention from Delgado’s own footnote mischief. He is a
genius at self-citation to increase his citation index. 204 It is estimated that
eight to ten percent of all citations are self-cites.205 In the first Chronicle
the self-cite percentage was twenty-four percent, by number ten it was
forty-one percent,206 by Rodrigo’s Final Chronicle it was forty-five per-
cent.207 (In fact it was not the final story as he continues to churn
Chronicles out.)208 His search for self-citation is irrepressible; the text
has the old Professor “reaching for a much-thumbed reprint,” which is a
Delgado article.209 The Chronicles became a primary source for citation;
when Rodrigo engages in CRT advocacy, the footnote reference is to Del-
gado rather than original sources. 210 Self-citation aside, he, like other
voice storytellers, prefers CRT sources,211 with his mentor Bell a favorite.
(Bell is cited thirteen times in the first Chronicle.)
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G.   Number Seven
Satire is a sort of glass wherein beholders do generally discover
everybody’s face but their own . . . .212
The justifications for the Law and Literature movement are that good
literature serves as reference for teaching writing skills and that works
such as Charles Dickens’s Bleakhouse tell us how society views law and
lawyers.213 To undermine the stability of interpretation, LPC pushed the
law and literature field to the outer limits by introducing deconstruc-
tion.214 Then came Crit Lit Chic—the use of fiction as a vehicle for trash-
ing.
Robin West has mastered this genre; for example, she uses a Kafka
short story about a hunger artist who charges admission for the public
display of his starvation to condemn Richard Posner’s economics. By
starving himself to death the Hunger Artist becomes the “ultimate Pos-
nerian entrepreneur” 215 whose world is based on consent, individualism,
and autonomy. The story “depicts a perfectly functioning Posnerian
commercial market that leaves all preferences satiated at every moment
of autonomous choice.”216 The dead white male, Franz Kafka, proves that
a community that endorses the Posnerian ideal of individualism and re-
fuses to intervene in societal disruptions is morally repugnant.217 Be-
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sees The Hunger Artist as a story about the artist with self-destructive impulses who “exploits
spirit until spirit injures body.” CHARLES NEIDER, THE FROZEN SEA: A STUDY OF FRANZ KAFKA 82
(1948). To Politzer, The Hunger Artist raises a paradox about art and fault: who is at fault for
an art (fasting) that is produced by a deficiency—the hunger artist “for not finding the right
food” or the world “for not provid ing him with it.” “The question aims ultimately at the mean-
ing of the role that the artist performs in any kind of human context.” HEINZ POLITZER, FRANZ
KAFKA , PARABLE AND PARADOX 306 (1962). Margot Norris writes that The Hunger Artist be-
longs with the “art and asceticism theme” of Kafka’s later works. MARGOT NORRIS, Sadism and
Masochism in “In the Penal Colony” and “A Hunger Artist” in READ KAFKA  170 (Mark Ander-
son ed. 1989). Ostensibly the hunger artist seeks the asceticism of spirit over flesh, of human
spirit over animalism. A tale of asceticism versus masochism, where, by starving himself to
death, the hunger artist succumbs, with pleasure, to masochism. Kafka had admitted: “Yes,
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cause Kafka’s work emanates from an impenetrable underground of
complex tensions he is an LPC favorite; his fiction can be deconstructed
to support any bias. Anthony D’Amato is ranked seventh for ingenuously
converting Kafka’s short story The Metamorphosis into a satirical de-
monization of Richard Posner’s economics.218
To LPC, Judge Posner personifies the Tyranny of Objectivity. His as-
sumption that every problem and act—including sex and sadism—is ac-
countable to the rules of economics is considered totalitarianistic. LPC
rejects his definition of morality according to efficiency and the free
market system. Posner is seen as the lead instigator of the Law and Eco-
nomics movement which attacks the left’s assumption of indeterminacy
and relativity.219 As “one of the intellectual phenomena of our age”220 his
prolific scholarship touches every institution, forcing LPC people to play
catch-up. D’Amato relies on satire to convert Posner’s success into per-
nicious mischief.
In The Metamorphosis Gregor Samsa is transformed into a bug dur-
ing a troubled night. The disciplined mind of a law professor helps him
adapt to a split life style as a man existing in the body of a thousand
legged cockroach. “[H]e is a divided creature, split, a halfway creature,
something that oscillates between animal and man, that could become
completely animal or return to being man and does not have the
strength for a complete metamorphosis.” 221 His sister, his contact with
the human world, ultimately rejects Gregor and after an angry confron-
tation with his father he dies of starvation.
Being morphed into a cockroach was a minor problem—the real
problem was that Gregor had to deal with the hideous burden of being
transformed into “an enormous Economic Analyst of Law.” 222 From then
on it was the nagging frustration of calculating the opportunity costs as-
sociated with getting out of bed (each moment he stayed in bed repre-
sented the consumption of money), trying to explain his utility function
to his mother by drawing a supply and demand curve (who unsympa-
thetically says: “But that isn’t a curve. It’s two straight lines like an X”)223
and the awareness that he had abandoned feelings and emotions. Gregor
now knew that judges decide most cases according to “the inexorable
iron laws of economics”224 and those that do not follow the iron laws are
wrong.
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Confined to his room due to the inability to resolve the opportunity
cost conundrum, he survives by resorting to a rational barter strategy to
haggle for meals with his sister who proves to be a tougher social Dar-
winist than Milton Friedman. “I will not,” she says, “be victimized any
longer by your self-serving appeals to altruism within the family.”225 His
unit of exchange was a long treatise on the economic approach to the law
of “ . . . ,” with Gregor producing a new treatise daily on a new topic,
starting with the law of usufructs and continuing through rape, incest,
etc. It was an effective assembly-line method; Gregor substituted a new
topic into the text without changing a single word. When the inevitable
flow of criticism came, it produced a new market—writing replies. Gre-
gor’s stock rebuttal was that his critics had not read or did not under-
stand his work. “His tactics threw his critics into disarray, and they be-
gan to accuse him of inconsistency, irrelevance, incoherence, incompe-
tence, and inhumanity. These charges had the unexpected effect of rais-
ing the visibility of Gregor’s writings, which now found their way into the
most remote journals of the profession.”226
Northrop Frye wrote that two things are essential to satire: “wit or
humor founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque or absurd, [and]
an object of attack,”227 D’Amato satisfies Frye’s criteria with a focused
LPC slant. The use of a well known Kafka story as a lead in establishes a
context of the bizarre and grotesque. There is no question about the ob-
jective—Law and Economics and Richard Posner. There is scorn and
ridicule; feeling and emotion, the “soft” values, are metamorphized out
of Posner/Gregor’s system. Posner/Gregor gleefully acccepts a Faus-
tusian barter—he becomes a prolific and famous writer, eventually able
to produce two treatises per day but it was writing without content, eco-
nomic equation writing that describes a nonexistent world. “He was
writing straight from the mind; even if the world outside his room had
ceased to exist—and for all he knew it had—he would not have been
obliged to revise a single word.” 228 Like the drones from the diabolical
Chicago School of Economics, he utilized the principle of repetition to
market his scholarship.229 Poor Posner/Gregor’s soul was in the posses-
sion of the devil of The Tyranny of Objectivity.
After a conclusion in which Posner/Gregor is hauled off to court
where he is confronted by himself as Judge (Posner thus meets himself)
who warns: “God save this Honorable Court,”230 the reader is given an
addendum of heavy LPC. Gregor is officially unmasked as Posner while
D’Amato details the criticisms of Law and Economics and ends with a
plea that imitates the ubiquitous Consciousness III:
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[I]f only we realized that the “rule of law,” and the market, and pris-
ons and police, and convention, and differences among persons in ap-
titude and character, and the bourgeois values, and prudence, and
asking students questions in class, and the monuments of Western
civilization (including that reactionary sexist work, the Nicomachean
Ethics), and maturity and professionalism and expertise and respect
and tradition, and, in just two words, institutions and constraints, or,
in a single word, “liberalism,” were all just so much authoritarian bull-
shit—then we could get on with the task (and it’s a lot easier than you
think) of building a warm, loving, caring, open, hopeful, hugging, un-
mediated, hierarchy-free, prelinguistic, emphatic, affective (but not
sentimental—liberals are sentimental), happy, herbivorous, weapon-
less, whole-grain, solar-powered, polymorphously perverse, classless,
Utopian society for the Whole Human Family.231
H.   Number Eight
It is hard to know how to evaluate this foray into new legal dis-
course.232
Judge Harry Edwards condemns law schools for subsidizing the pres-
ence of “impractical scholars” who engage in irrelevant chatter and ig-
nore their obligation to the audience of lawyers, judges, and legisla-
tors.233 LPC responds by charging that doctrinal scholarship is infected
with a Liberal white male bias that marginalizes minorities and femi-
nists. Delgado argues that the establishment abhors narratives because
they “jar, mock, or displace a tenet of the majoritarian faith.”234 The di-
lemma for storytellers is that in escaping the restraints of the doctrinal
style they must face up to the responsibility of voicing evaluative criteria
for their methodology. To achieve parity they are obligated to compose
criteria that shows the community how to make judgments on quality.
Evaluation capability is tested by Marie Ashe’s Zig-Zag Stitching and
the Seamless Web: Thoughts on “Reproduction” and the Law.235 It is a
story of her “anger,” “humiliation,” “indignation,” “desperation,” “hor-
ror,” and “rage” at law and the legal regulation of birthing. The discourse
“originates in men; it defines women with certainty; it attempts to mask
the operations of power; it silences other discourse.”236 The pleasant ex-
periences of home birthing are vividly contrasted with the agonies of the
hospital treatment: “He slit my vagina. Then he backed off.”237 “I feel
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they are trying to kill me . . . . This pain destroys me.” 238 “He raped
me.”239 Ashe describes other agonies: the death of her friend at age 34
from cancer, the death of her father, a prosecutor insults her by ad-
dressing her as Mrs. rather than Ms. as requested, and the remorse from
purposely drowning five pups: “I have not forgotten the weight of those
small, wet, stiffened forms in my hands.”240
The story seems to be an effort to dramatize the ambiguity and perva-
siveness of the regulation of abortion and birthing. The harmful conse-
quences come from male abstractionism that fails to account for the fe-
male experience. Ashe proposes a feminist critique: “It seems to me that
the departure point for such exploration must be women’s own accounts
of our experiences, uttered with a commitment of faithfulness to the
truths of female bodies suppressed in the dominant discourse.”241 But
beyond these observations and a call for a discourse, Zig-Zag is not an
easy read.
To the doctrinalist, Zig-Zag reads like the machine gun babble out of
Bridget Jones’s Diary242 or like Molly Bloom’s unpunctuated stream of
consciousness monologue in Ulysses .243 Ashe rejects structure, plot, and
closure as she throws out her innermost musings, relying on emotional
outbursts to carry her story. The problem for the doctrinalist is that ex-
cept for opaque impressionistic generalizations on the trauma of birth-
ing we aren’t sure of what the story is—or if there is a story. With these
barriers, an observer cannot make a judgment on the primary doctrinal
evaluative criterion of: “Does this scholarship increase human knowl-
edge, and if so, by how much?”244
This is the reaction that LPC storytellers expect—and seek. It enables
them to carry out a strategy of challenging doctrinal criteria as exclu-
sionary to minority work in order to protect the status quo of a biased
system. “Majoritarian tools of analysis, themselves only stories, inevita-
bly will pronounce outsider versions lacking in typicality, rigor, gener-
alizability, and truth.” 245 Being excluded justifies a declaration of inde-
pendence; LPC storywriters have created a new paradigm of legal schol-
arship and as creators have exclusive authority over evaluative criteria.246
LPC evaluation of narrative is guided by the subjectivism of the self.
The story must incorporate LPC perspectives, advance the interests of
the oppressed community, and validate the aspirations of the marginal-
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ized. Standards are derived from the discourse of members of the rele-
vant community—icon storytellers like Bell, Williams, and Delgado.
Truth, the ultimate goal of scholarship, has been redefined to respond to
the essentialism of the marginalized. The new definition does not refer to
universal truth—objective truth—but refers to a relative truth that is
“true to the vision of those for whom the work purports to speak,” and
“presented in good faith and . . . as honest as the author can make [it].”247
Evaluation is an effort in deconstruction that enables the reader to as-
sume authority over the destiny of the text. Moreover, LPC’s assumption
of speaking in a unique voice that restricts comprehension and peer re-
view to the jurisdiction of the storytelling community assures a favorable
review,248 enabling Zig-Zag to achieve equal status with articles by Law-
rence Tribe or Richard Posner.
While Zig-Zag is a challenge to the doctrinalist, 249 Kathryn Abrams,
as a member of the relevant community, is able to parse its meaning. She
begins by praising Ashe’s narratives for their “pungency, intimacy, and
dominance over the landscape of her article.” 250 While conceding that
reading it “can be a jarring experience.”251 Abrams detects an effort by
Ashe to use the painful experiences to introduce a feminist discourse on
birthing in response to the male mainstream’s failure to tune into female
narratives. Yet Abrams acknowledges the difficulty of understanding
Ashe’s cryptic style and doubts whether she speaks for all women. Nev-
ertheless, Abrams recognizes several possible interpretations: first, “a
kind of radical subjectivity that maps one set of individual experiences
directly into a legal rule” 252 that rejects any medical—legal regulation of
childbirth. Or, alternatively, Ashe may be leaving open the possibility of
diversity that “permits her to choose some voices over others.”253
Abrams allows that Ashe’s vague and opaque narrative builds reso-
nance for an LPC audience. Although she had to read the story three
times to make a tentative interpretation, Abrams nevertheless admired
and learned from “the uncompromising approach to critique that led
Marie Ashe to frame her argument in such relentlessly concrete and
nonlinear terms.”254 While dissenting from Ashe’s methodological
choice, Abrams does not dispute the academic credibility and legitimacy
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of a narrative that forces the reader to respond to a story in its “unmedi-
ated form.”255 If nothing else, it is an opportunity for each reader to de-
construct Zig-Zag to uncover a personal meaning.
I.   Number Nine
Does adolescent and post-adolescent promiscuity make me excep-
tional, and therefore—again—marginal (You’ve got to be kidding.) A
better question: Is it worth it? I wonder if it is possible to explain—at
all—to men who remember their own  sexual adolescence and initia-
tion as one of continual rejections from women, that other men—the
ones who scored—got it more often than not by overt intimidation.
That they accomplished this great triumph by refusing to even see
the girl’s subjectivity, much less give a damn for her welfare, by
making their profound lack of concern manifest, and then by ex-
ploiting her resulting (fully justified) perception of his
dangerousness.256
Robin West is the most fearless member of the LPC collective, taking
on Richard Posner and the Chicago Law and Economics people,257 duel-
ing other feminists,258 extolling the virtues of the literary woman, 259 and,
as the above quote acknowledges, she even memorializes her own sexual
promiscuity. Although several of her articles are serious prospects for
the Top Ten, (most notably the piece attacking Posner’s economics)260
her most irrepressible and eccentric piece is a seven page deconstruction
of Duncan Kennedy’s views on Crit sexuality published in the Wisconsin
Women’s Law Journal when she was an assistant professor. 261 West cites
Kennedy’s state of the movement comments as evidence that white male
Crits systematically oppress and disempower Fem-Crits.262
To West, the problem starts with the institutionalization of words
which enables CLS to compose verbal constructs to mask hierarchy. On
the assumption that deconstruction is a tactic that favors the marginal-
ized disempowered as a counter to the dominant verbal constructs of the
empowered, she turns it on CLS and Kennedy. “We must understand
what men with power within CLS are doing with words and to
women—and how they use words to mask what it is they do.”263 The Crit
word façade begins to crack like Dorian Gray’s portrait when Kennedy
makes the mistake of admitting that Fem-Crits “face a very difficult
problem” dealing with Crits: the “internal challenge” of dealing with op-
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pression and the temptation of sexual desire.264 The result is “a feminist
taboo on seductive self-presentation and on competition with other
women.” West’s deconstruction starts with Kennedy’s explicit vision of
heterosexual desire.  Kennedy states:
First, there is desire—between men and women and also between men
and between women . . . .
Second, there is the historical fact of the oppression of women by
men . . . . Oppression on the basis of gender is the actual context
within which cls came into being—“its no accident that the mentors
are men”—and cls has never been a counter-sphere within which it
was absent . . . .
. . . .
[T]he internal structure of the conference is unmistakably reflective of
the larger patriarchy. Men have much more power than women . . .
.”
265
Taking the perspective of a disempowered marginalized feminist de-
constructionist, West joins the first two claims to unmask Kennedy’s vi-
sion of sexual desire: powerful and privileged white male Crits desire
disempowered Fem-Crits while oppressed Fem-Crits sexually desire
powerful Crits. 266 The key word is “between” (emphasized above) which
indicates sexual desire is “reciprocal and symmetrical” even though the
hierarchical relationship between Crit and Fem-Crit is asymmetrical.
From the sequence of the first claim that desire is natural and the second
claim of the existence of gender oppression in CLS, West offers a decon-
structive summary of Kennedy’s argument:
[Desire] is as good as it is natural and can lead to good things. It can,
for example, free what the mentors have to give, and at least on occa-
sion it might lead to equality and love. [Nevertheless,] like all taboos,
the feminist political taboo against expressing natural sexual desire,
while understandable, is unfortunate—it leads to ‘rough sledding.’
Kennedy complains it inhibits the mentor; and it prevents the mentee
from entering the mentor’s universe and from getting all the mentor
has to give.267
West used a deconstruction performance to show that a CLS legend
who professes to champion community over individualism, altruism
over capitalism, and who recants the Liberal white male hegemony, har-
bors anti-feminist views. It gets worse; Kennedy preaches a sermon that
celebrates empowered institutions—marriage, family, law, and the
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popular media—who collectively are responsible for a laundry list of
anti-feminist evils, e.g. the refusal to acknowledge marital rape as rape,
to recognize workplace sexual harassment, that teenage pregnancy is the
result of teenage male coercion, that pornography causes no harm, etc.268
Context renders West’s fearlessness even more impressive. In 1986
CLS was the leading left radical movement in legal education and its
leader,269 Duncan Kennedy, was making headlines terrorizing Harvard
Law School.270 Along comes a lowly assistant professor from a second
tier law school excoriating him for a “dangerously anti-feminist inter-
pretation of women’s behavior,”271 telling him that “he doesn’t get it,”272
while accusing him of indulging in “self-pity.” 273 Even more remarkable
is the clairvoyance of West’s warning that if CLS did not change its atti-
tude, feminists should leave the movement.274 CLS ignored her and the
split widened with the feminists expanding their influence to become the
dominant anti-Liberal movement in legal education, ultimately relegat-
ing CLS to the scrapeheap, and, as Kennedy admitted, “dead as a door-
nail.”275
West adheres to the LPC contradiction that deconstruction, which re-
pudiates any fixed meaning, can nevertheless be warped to immutably
define the meaning of the political opposition’s language. 276 She summa-
rizes:
The commitment to deconstruction, if its dictates are consistently
followed, should make CLS members willing, even if unhappy, listen-
ers of feminist claims. Deconstruction commits the theorist to at least
the coherency of the claim that what a culture or institution has de-
fined as natural is in fact a social, cultural or institutional imperative.
The core radical-feminist claim that “heterosexuality is compul-
sory”—a socially rather than naturally imposed imperative—badly
needs the deconstructionist’s commitment for its minimal coher-
ency.277
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Since deconstruction assumes, “an element of temporality in language”
and that “a word means something different each time it is used,”278
there can never be, by definition, coherency nor is there ever a commit-
ment to coherency. It is, however, the custom of LPC to selectively ig-
nore the indeterminacy of deconstruction when it suits the argument.
J.   Number Ten
Scholars generally have a stake in their own norms or methods; they
will tend to conclude that a work with different ones should not be
persuasive to a rational decisionmaker, or would not be applicable
by other scholars.279
On occasion LPC scholars prefer to unleash new normative judg-
ments within the doctrinal style; the goal is to make sure the message is
comprehensible and bursts on the reader like a slap on the face. Speak-
ing from the mainstream perspective, Professor Rubin notes that LPC
work can become an issue in deviant scholarship, posing the questions:
how should the community deal with method or substance that is devi-
ant from the mores of traditional scholarship, “[w]ould a rational deci-
sionmaker be persuaded,” and “Does the work contain an insight that
scholars could apply?” 280 Anything that receives a negative response to
these questions is too extreme or dissonant to constitute scholarship.281
Kennedy and Gabel playing intersubjective zap in Roll Over Beetho-
ven while mocking the establishment is good LPC work but probably too
deviant and extreme under Rubin’s analysis. Other than mocking doc-
trinal methodology it has no message and addresses a small insular Crit
in-group.282 Likewise Mark Tushnet, a prolific writer and co-founder of
CLS,283 produced LPC shock with an audacious review of Strange Jus-
tice: The Selling of Clarence Thomas.284 In Tushnet’s view the book es-
tablishes “beyond a reasonable doubt—that Clarence Thomas lied during
his confirmation hearings.”285 Although he concedes that impeachment
after confirmation is highly unlikely, Tushnet wants to make Thomas
pay for his perjury. How will Thomas pay? When the Court hands down
a 5-4 decision with Justice Thomas part of the majority, citizens should
simply ignore the decision as “law at all.” “Although the prospect of
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scholar who did not already agree with her substantive positions would find her insights use-
ful.” Id. at 959. He contrasts this with her work on sexual harassment, which “seem more per-
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282. “It is true,” admits Kelman, “that our Utopian ‘work’ has been strictly anti or non in -
tellectual.” Kelman, supra note 19, at 336.
283. See  Tushnet, supra note 132.
284. J ANE MAYER & J ILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE J USTICE : THE SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS
(1994).
285. Mark V. Tushnet, Clarence Thomas: The Constitutional Problems, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 466, 466 (1995).
268 FL O R I D A  S T  AT E U N I V E RSI T  Y   LA W RE V I E W [Vol. 27:233
widespread disregard of such decisions is slight, at least it is a remedy in
the hands of citizens themselves, rather than their representatives.”286
It was the type of LPC message that attracts media attention, provid-
ing Tushnet an opportunity to proudly announce that he is “‘among the
more radical constitutional law professors’ in the country.”287 When
questioned about the article, one of the book’s co-authors replied that its
conclusions were “poppycock” and “silly.” 288 Tushnet’s attention getting
flippancy is a manifestation of the pull of the public intellectual circuit.
In today’s pop media culture controversy is the vehicle to recognition;
Tushnet got his fifteen minutes, then faded back to the politics of aca-
deme. On the other hand, the Number Ten selection—Paul Butler’s Ra-
cially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System289—is a blue-print for the aspiring LPC public intellectual.
Jury nullification, in which a juror believes the accused is guilty but
nevertheless votes to acquit, was a hot issue when Butler’s article came
out. A string of controversial verdicts—Bernhard Goetz, William Ken-
nedy Smith, Lorena Bobbitt, Rodney King, the Menendez brothers, and
O.J. Simpson—produced a new group of talking heads who now form a
permanent media circus and who, according to the president of the
American Bar Association, “pimp their dubious talents and hustle the
public . . . .”290 One of the hot topics for the pimps was jury nullification
by juries who seemingly acquitted on the basis of one of the abuse de-
fenses—a result generally condemned by the commentators as a threat to
the criminal justice system.291
Butler carried the debate to a new level by arguing that not only
should nullification be tolerated but it is the “moral responsibility of
black jurors to emancipate some guilty black outlaws.”292 It was a reprise
of Black Panther Don Cox who announced at a Lenny Bernstein party in
the 1970s: “We want all black men who are in jail to be set free.”293 Butler
trumps Cox; his “goal is the subversion of American criminal justice . . . .
Through jury nullification, I want to dismantle the master’s house with
the master’s tools.”294
All race based LPC scholarship assumes the presence of white su-
premacy. Butler agrees, tying capitalism into a system that excludes
Blacks from educational and employment opportunities, and forces
young Blacks into crime—including Black on Black crime.295 The result is
                                                                                                                                                
286. Id. at 477-78.
287. Tony Mauro, Should We Just Ignore Thomas?, LEGAL TIMES , Dec. 4, 1995, at 11.
288. Id.
289. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J.  677 (1995).
290. Gail D. Cox, Bushnell: O.J. Commentators Are ‘2 $ Hookers,’ NAT’L L.J.,  June 12,
1995, at A4.
291. See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE (1994); SUSAN ESTRICH ,
GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER  (1998).
292. Butler, supra note 289 , at 679.
293. “We want them to be set free because they have not had fair trials. We’ve been tried by
predominantly middle-class, all-white juries . . . . ” TOM WOLFE , RADICAL CHIC AND MAU-
MAUING THE FLAK CATCHES  20 (1970).
294. Butler, supra note 289 , at 680.
295. Id. at 693-94. Butlet comments:
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the incarceration of an inordinate number of Black youths evoking a
comparison to a police state.296 The other prong of the white supremacy
assumption is that in a race warped democracy which subordinates
Blacks the majority rule “is, morally speaking, i llegitimate.”297 Under
these conditions nullification is a form of self-help that gives Blacks
power to mete out justice in a way the system does not.
Under Butler’s nullification program, jurors were left to intuition:
when a poor woman steals from Tiffany’s, a juror “might” nullify, but not
when she robs a next door neighbor.298 While ghetto drug dealers should
normally be convicted, jurors should retain discretion to nullify if they
believe the dealer would go straight upon release.299 Jurors who nullify
“might be morally obligated to participate in black self-help programs,
such as those proposed by Louis Farrakhan.”300 Given gross economic
inequalities, Butler “encourages” nullification of theft from “the very
wealthy”.301
Unlike Tushnet who was playing a Crit roll-over Beethoven game,
Butler responded to a festering problem with an incendiary solution. His
proposal got legs from the concern that race nullification was already
prevalent and posed a serious threat to the criminal justice system. What
he did was to codify and sanction what had been recognized as a power,
but not a right.302 Moreover, it didn’t hurt his cause that he was speaking
in the wake of the most racially divisive trial in our history. Within a year
of publication, Butler was both famous and notorious. The article was
abridged in Harper’s303 while he appeared on 60 Minutes , Jesse Jack-
son’s Equal Time, Geraldo, and duked it out with two legacies from the
O.J. trial, Roger Cossack and Greta Van Susteren on Burden of Proof.
Along with recognition came a loud chorus of criticism. There was the
general concern that nullification would lead to “anarchy,”304 while the
New York Times called his article “troubling.” “The criminal justice sys-
tem is certainly imperfect, but this sort of wrecking is not the way to fix
it.”305 Randall Kennedy wrote that the Article “gives voice to erroneous
claims, dubious calculations, and destructive sentiments.”306
                                                                                                                                                
Some property crimes committed by blacks may be understood as an inevitable re-
sult of the tension between the dominant societal message equating possession of
material resources with success and happiness and the power of white supremacy
to prevent most African-Americans from acquiring “enough” of those resources in a
legal manner.
Id.
296. See  id.  at 691.
297. Id. at 710.
298. See id. at 715.
299. See  id.  at 719.
300. Id. at 717, n.214.
301. Id. at 722.
302. See  U.S. v. Karley, 838 F.2d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 1988).
303. Paul Butler, Black Jurors: Right to Acquit? Jury Nullification, HARPER ’ S MAG., Dec.,
1995, at 11.
304. Greta Van Susteren, Burden of Proof, (CNN television broadcast, Jan. 15, 1996) (Tran -
script No. 76 on file with author).
305. Editorial, When the Jurors Ignore the Law, N.Y. TIMES , May 27, 1997, at A14.
306. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME , AND THE LAW 299 (1997).
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The doctrinalist who adheres to the Rubin model would accuse Butler
of being irrational, impractical, relying on false assumptions and hence
too dissonant from acceptable scholarship.307 Drug crimes are not vic-
timless and putting dealers back on the streets exacerbates the hard life
for people in the inner city.308 He ignores the negative effects on en-
forcement and prosecution while failing to consider the likely legislative
response: eliminating unanimous verdicts.309 The plan of implementa-
tion is fuzzy aspiration; jurors would have to separate rehabilitatable
pushers from the incorrigible, identify those defendants who stole to
support a habit, and determine whether the victim of the thief was poor,
middle-class or wealthy. The final criticism is fatal: the relevant factual
information necessary for jurors to make a relatively accurate decision
on these fine points is inadmissible.310 Subsequent to the publication of
his article, the Second Circuit summarized the mainstream view: “We
categorically reject the idea that, in a society committed to the rule of
law, jury nullification is desirable or that courts may permit it to occur
when it is within their authority to prevent.”311
From the majoritarian perspective these are valid and fatal criticisms,
but are irrelevant to race LPC. Butler, like Derrick Bell in The Slave
Traders,312 is preaching a parable: If Black people fail to take drastic self-
help measures to protect their life blood of young men, the capitalist re-
gime will continue to exploit their labor and devalue their lives. “When
white folks say ‘justice,’ they mean ‘just us.’”313 Like Bell, Butler is saying
                                                                                                                                                
307. Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Response to
Professor Butler , 44 UCLA L. REV. 109 (1996).
308. “In a moral sense, drug dealing in black communities is the ultimate black-on-black
crime. It is the descendant of the slave trade that once put our ancestors in bondage. Just as the
slave trade could not have succeeded without the help of Africans, the drug trade of today could
not flourish without black help.” Joseph H. Brown, Who’s Really Selling Out Fellow Blacks?,
TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 24, 1996, at Commentary 6.
309. One commentator notes:
The people who believe that jury nullification poses a serious problem also often
propose a solution: States should switch to allowing non-unanimous ve rdicts in
criminal cases. The idea is to allow a supermajority of jurors—who, it is assumed,
can usually be depended upon to follow the law—simply to outvote radical, outly-
ing, nullifying jurors, reducing the number of hung juries, saving court time, and
achieving swifter, sterner justice.
Roger Parloff, Race and Juries: If It Ain’t Broke . . ., AM . LAW. June, 1997, at 5.
310. Conceding the validity of this criticism, Butler says: “So, in either the current regime
or with the implementation of jury nullification, the juror’s difficult job of a ssessing blame-
worthiness might be, in part, a shot in the dark. Given that, I think it is better to err on the side
of emancipation of African-American people.” Paul Butler, The Evil of American Criminal Jus-
tice: A Reply, 44 UCLA L. REV. 143, 155 (1996).
311. U.S. v. Grady Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997).
312. In the year 2000, a fleet of space ships appears to trade with what has become an eco-
nomically besieged U.S. The traders offer gold, critical chemicals and safe nuclear power in ex-
change for all African Americans. There is loud indignation at this offer of slave trading. After
reflection, an enabling constitutional amendment is approved by a seventy percent vote and the
trade is made. “And just as the forced importation of those African ancestors had made the na-
tion’s wealth and productivity possible, so their forced exodus saved the country from the need
to pay the price of its greed-based excess.” Derrick Bell, After We’re Gone: Prudent Specula -
tions On America In a Post-Racial Epoch, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393, 400 (1990).
313. Butler, supra note 289, at 690, n.72 (quoting Henry L. Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of
Looking at a Black Man, NEW YORKER , Oct. 23, 1995 at 56, 58).
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that since white supremacy will never freely share equality with Blacks,
nullification is morally justified.
There is more to Butler’s agenda—he uses the doctrinal style to sub-
vert the doctrinal style. He ostensibly adheres to the linear methodology,
uses Blue Book footnote etiquette, and writes in legalese. Nevertheless,
he is speaking race LPC, targeting the public intellectual audi-
ence—which accounts for the easy conversion into an essay for Harper’s.
In a rebuttal to criticism, he explains his methodology:
In the Christian faith tradition of many African Americans, preach-
ers sometimes describe an epistemology of “knowing what you know.”
Knowing what you know refers to those beliefs, often emotional, that
are at the core of one’s being and that precede or subvert education
and other formal ways of knowing . . . . Knowing what you know gives
law review editors headaches because it does not lend itself to formal
citation.314
III.   THE IMPLICATIONS
Now some people say there will be no law in the law schools.315
Sex and self dominate the LPC Top Ten. Frug monologues on the
torture of male sex exploitation, Williams draws attention to the ordeals
of “I am,”316 Morris excoriates military masculinity, West deconstructs
Crit sexual despotism, while Ashe suffers from birthing trauma. Wil-
liams, Bell, Delgado, and Ashe are storytel lers. Gabel and Kennedy do
postmodern hallucinogenic performance art. All of the articles scorn the
doctrinal style—including Butler who used the linear method to mock
doctrinalism with the irrebutable “I know what I know” routine. With
the possible exception of D’Amato’s satire, the authors are angry and
bitter which Williams, Frug, and Ashe, carry into paranoia.317
I have excluded consideration of articles that critique and analyze the
storytelling genre. They tend to be linear advocacy work rationalizing the
nontraditional methodology of narratives: Lawrence says that narratives
possess the power “to build bridges of validation, understanding, and
                                                                                                                                                
314. Butler, supra note 310 , at 143-44.
315. Charles Rothfeld, What Do Law Schools Teach? Almost Anything, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
23, 1988, at B8.
316. Reputably “the shortest complete sentence in the English Language.” AKRON BEACON
J ., July 19, 1998, at F1.
317. According to Farber and Sherry, this can create static between LPCs and traditional-
ists:
Although this paranoid mode of thought does not necessarily signify either falsity
or abnormality, it does isolate radical multiculturalists from the kind of dialogue
that might lead them to modify their views. For paranoids can be difficult patients
to treat—any overtures are interpreted as hostile, and their ideas are impossible to
refute. Radical multiculturalists tend to take a similar posture with respect to out-
siders. Either the criticism is another effort by members of the dominant group to
maintain their status and power, or it is pandering by members of the oppressed
group to the power structure. Even outsiders who purport to be sympathetic to the
radical mlticulturalist position may be viewed with suspicion—they may be co-
opting the radical poten tial of the movement.
FARBER & SHERRY , supra note 11, at 136.
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empathy.”318 Baron connects the movement to those “who lack power or
who represent those who do.”319 Halewood recommends that “white male
legal academics must recognize the legitimacy—even the superiority—of
certain ‘outsider’ perspectives on these issues, and assume the role of
secondary contributors to the development of scholarship in these ar-
eas.”320 Van Praagh concludes that storytelling “gives significance to
emotion and provides a space for multiple experiences and perspec-
tives.”321 Milner Ball suggests that the function of storytelling is to
“nudge the language of law toward art.”322 While these articles validate
the relevance of LPC storytelling they do not add to the corpus of the
genre.
Uninhibited by formalism, the LPC methodology is in a constant state
of evolution. As the LPC crowd is fond of gloating—everyone is writing
stories and everything is a story.323 Even practical clinicians have been
seduced by the narrative genre, producing stories of attorney-client re-
lationships, with the client a metaphor for subordinated esteem, intimi-
dation, and objectification.324 One of the more innovative conversions is
to announce that “Judges, as storytellers, tell their audiences that
something happened.”325 When an opinion becomes a story, the reader
as author-interpreter has the self-commissioned discretion to decon-
struct what the court says with empathy, agony drama, and subjective
imagination: “[R]eadings of judicial narratives always diverge as readers’
individual imaginations push them to their own meanings.”326
Innovative techniques and new disciples to narrative create a good
and bad news dilemma for LPC people. The good news is the enhanced
visibility and an increase in the flow of LPC writing that can be trans-
lated into more political influence in the academy. But there is a down-
side: success is sparking vigorous criticism from the doctrinialist, who,
despite some erosion of authority, still dominate legal education.
As a legacy of Langdell’s notion of law as a science, 327 the doctrinal
methodology relies on analysis and neutrality to solve problems and
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322. Milner S. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 H ARV. L. REV. 1855,
1862 (1990).
323. To prove this point Professor Lopez has written a story about the problem of ge tting
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sired remedy.” Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10 (1984).
324. See  Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF . L. REV. 1 (1990); see also  William L.F. Felstiner &
Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client
Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (1992).
325. Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68  TEXAS L. REV. 381, 386 (1989).
326. Id. at 400.
327. See  supra note 13.
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counsel decisionmakers, attorneys, and the academy.328 The ultimate
objective is to add to our knowledge of law, either through explication or
prescription of normative standards.329 For political reasons LPC rejects
linear analysis and objectivity and, to the chagrin of the doctrinalist,
does not address law qua law. The proof is in the pudding; nine of the
top ten articles do not seek to resolve legal problems or endeavor to add
to the knowledge of law. Frug writes about the meaning, culture, and
subordination of the female body and only in an ambiguous way does
she generalize on the criminalization of sex.330 To Williams, shopping,
the homeless, and beggars trump law as she briefly ponders that a TV ad
“—an orgasmic peep show—”331 might suggest false advertising issues but
then quickly moves on to lament the behavior of selfish students. Morris
combines politics, psychology, sociology, and statistical analysis, to con-
vict the military of masculinity. Her concluding section on breaking
down military aggressiveness is vibrant LPC, but makes no normative
judgments on law.332
Gabel and Kennedy disdain legal rights discussion, instead preferring
a dialogue on themselves as they contemplate zapping the pods of the
Liberal empire. Bell uses allegory to preach about race oppression, Del-
gado’s narrative explores the malignancy of Western culture, while West
deconstructs Kennedy’s Critspeak into sexism. Even Abrams, an LPC
supporter, could discern only “possibilities”333 of a legal vision in Zig-
Zag, perhaps a plea for nonregulation. Number Ten is the only article
that deals with law as the central topic and seeks to solve a problem
                                                                                                                                                
328. “It involves the careful reading and comparison of appellate opinions with a view to
identifying ambiguities, exposing inconsistencies among cases and lines of cases, developing
distinctions, reconciling holdings, and otherwise exercising the characteristic skills of legal
analysis.” Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J . 1113,
1113 (1981).
329. See  Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and “White Male” Standards: Some Lessons
from the Patent Law , 100 YALE L.J . 2065, 2068-69 (1991); see also Edward L. Rubin, On Be-
yond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889, 903-04 (1992).
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mined.” Frug, supra note 34 , at 1075.
331. WILLIAMS , supra note 63, at 308. “On a more complicated level, I worry that in ac-
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structed our very notion of property.” Id at 309.
332. In defining the factors that link masculinity to military culture Morris borrows from
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with the “modern firepower” argument, a refrain that dates back to the cross-bow. Her re-
sponse to the male’s need to establish a separate identity from the mother in fluence as a cause
of masculinity is shared parenting. See  Morris, supra note 87, at 750. Then comes the just war-
rior as a counter to macho posturing. For support Morris refers to William Manchester’s de-
scription of John Wayne visiting he and his wounded buddies who booed him as a “symbol of
fake machismo we had come to hate.” Id. at 755 (quoting William Manchester, The Bloodiest
Battle of All, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 14, 1987, at 84). While the doctrinalist would scoff at a
Manchester cite as anecdotal I would criticize Morris’s failure to appreciate the message. Morris
ignores the effects of the two culture syndrome in warfare—the combat culture vs. the rear
echelon culture. There is an impenetrable wall between the cultures—one bonded by death and
survival, the other living with the guilt of not being part of “it.” The reaction to Wayne was a re-
sult of the two culture syndrome and has no bearing on the just warrior. Anyone who has been
in combat knows that a distinction between a just and unjust warrior is ludicrous. The only dis-
tinction I encoun tered was between those that survived and those that did not.
333. Abrams, supra note 232 , at 1011.
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through race jury nullification. But Butler departs from the doctrinal
paradigm by endorsing an off-the-wall solution, ignores serious im-
pediments, and replaces the logic of analysis with LPC intuition.
As that old curmudgeon Kingsfield might growl: “Law and logic
chopping—that’s what scholarship is all about.” To many, Kingsfield ex-
poses a spreading malaise: we are witnessing the demise of law in legal
education. Too many faculty members are ivory tower dilettantes,334
writing for each other in a private elitist code. 335 Richard Epstein sum-
marizes:
The modern academic discourses of critical theory and new voices
have thus far contributed nothing to the debate on substantive legal
issues beyond the constant, repetitive assertion of their own rele-
vance. Even on the issues most relevant to their own concerns, they
lack the basic conceptual apparatus necessary for understanding.
What we have are merely asser tions that theirs is a large turf that out-
siders may not share. 336
The Kingsfields and Epsteins of the academy can take a small slice of
solace from the Crit experience. The CLS movement started with a
flourish—numerous articles ferreting out indeterminacy in contracts,
torts, labor, and other basic categories. After the initial power high from
fame and notoriety the Crits crashed. Without the guidance of the ana-
lytical process, the messages became platitudinous337 or incomprehensi-
ble overdoses of rhetoric. 338 The Crit version of pseudo deconstruction
replaced analysis with simplistic trashing, which inevitably led to the all
encompassing conclusion that the system is evil and should be replaced
with a new vision such as Kennedy’s notion of altruism.339 The most seri-
ous dead end came when the Crits could not come up with solutions af-
ter concluding that everything is indeterminate. 340
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bor as thyself.)” Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685, 1717 (1976).
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You Sincerely Want to Be a Radical? 36 STAN. L. REV. 247, 282 (1984).
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The doctrinal establishment cannot read too much into the dissolu-
tion of CLS. While the Crits were a noisy bunch, they were a modest in-
fluence in LPC. They authored their own demise by stubbornly refusing
to recognize the goals of the LPC majority who demand specific changes
in rights instead of chatter about utopias. The LPC majority writes about
hate speech, pornography, and race and gender harassment rather than
the mush of Consciousness III and intersubjective zap. As Patricia Wil-
liams warned the Crits: “In discarding rights altogether, one discards a
symbol too deeply enmeshed in the psyche of the oppressed to lose with-
out trauma and much resistance.”341 As a result, there is a law orientation
in mainstream LPC. Hence, writing that imitates the top ten’s failure to
connect with normative judgments on law could be susceptible to the
same fate as CLS (what is left after the agony drama is tapped out) but
less so as long as LPC continues to simultaneously produce rights schol-
arship.
I have been uncomfortable with the publication of law review articles
in the form of short stories, or short stories in the form of law review
articles, because they strike me as yet another manifesta tion of the
“lawyer as astrophysicist” mentality that I have criticized. 342
Four of the Top Ten belong to the storytelling genre: Williams offers a
postmodern mesh of agony and anger, 343 Ashe affects the crisis memoir
style,344 Bell proselytizes with a parable, 345 Delgado relies on dialogue to
castigate western culture.346 The goal of storytelling is to erode and sub-
vert doctrinal objectivity and analysis. Success depends on a strategy
that can evade the obligations of the Culture of Critical Discourse that
governs doctrinalism and imposes a duty to criticize and be open to criti-
cism.347 Where the genre is storytelling, critical inquiry and objectivity
are not, as Posner observes, “rules of the literature game.”348
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This was brought home to me in a conversation with a former roommate, now a
professor of literature, in which my wife and I were trying to identify the au thor of a
line of poetry quoted in a newspaper puzzle. My friend immediately began by say-
ing something like, ‘Well, it couldn’t be by X because the line is too long for him.’ I
realized then that there is a world of understanding about literature to which I e s-
sentially have no access, and I now wonder about the degree to which other law
professors do.
Tushnet, supra note 132, at 1515 n.1; see also  Lloyd Cohen, A Different Black Voice in Legal
Scholarship, 37 N.Y.L. SCH . L. REV. 301 (1992).
343. See supra Part II.B.
344. See supra Part II.H.
345. See supra Part II.E.
346. See supra Part II.F.
347. One commentator observers:
The essence of critical discourse is in its insistence on reflexivity. There is the obli-
gation to examine what had hitherto been taken for granted, to transform givens
into problems, resources into topics: to examine the life we lead, rather than just
enjoy or suffer it. It is therefore not only the present but also the anti-present, the
critique of the present and the assumptions it uses, that the culture of critical dis-
course must also challenge. In other words: the culture of critical discourse must
put its hands around its own throat, and see how long it can squeeze.
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Doctrinalist stipulate that scholarship must be supported by verifica-
tion roadmaps. With storytelling there is no way to provide verification
for a response to the question: “Is the author’s account what it purports
to be.”349 For parables or narrative-dialogues this question is irrelevant;
these genres are, by definition, fictional, composed as vehicles to teach a
lesson or moral.350 The verification question is, however, very relevant to
the autobiographical narrative used by Williams, Culp, and Ashe. The
coming together of the author and reader forms the autobiographical
contract, which assumes truth. “Not only does the reader expect truth
from autobiography, but autobiographers themselves all made more or
less successful efforts to get at the truth.”351 Yet verification of the Wil-
liams, Culp, and Ashe stories is an insurmountable challenge, made vir-
tually impossible by the use of highly personal musings and by the lack
of objective references such as the identification of characters, dates,
etc., which are subject to verification.352
To the doctrinalist, it is a breach of academic culture to recognize a
methodology that so willingly lends itself to disguising fictive professions
of truth.353 The most generous reaction is doubt and suspicion. After
praising Williams’s Benetton354 story for its rhetorical punch, Posner
pauses with a reservation: “Yet here at the very pinnacle of Williams’s
art, the careful reader will begin to feel a sense of disquiet.”355 There are
too many unexplained gaps in her description of encounters for Judge
Posner.356 Coughlin expresses “nagging ambivalence over the truth”357 of
Williams’s sausage machine story.358 Even Williams acknowledged ru-
mors over the veracity of Benetton.359 Without the structural constraints
of analysis and objectivity the role of the motives of the self intrudes into
the discourse between author and audience. “Are there,” asks William
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Gass about autobiography, “any motives for the enterprise that aren’t
tainted with conceit or a desire for revenge or a wish for justification?”360
Ironically, storytellers look to motive to finesse the truth issue. In-
stead of rational analysis, autobiographical narratives rely on emotion
and catharsis to ridicule, distract, and dissipate the tenants of the ma-
joritarian faith.361 It is a subjective and passionate engagement, not ob-
jective truth, that defines autobiographical narratives and insulates them
from critical discourse.362 More decisively, the storyteller’s grand motive
is bonding and transformation;363 circulating oppression stories provides
a forum for discussion among the marginalized while simultaneously
informing the dominant culture of the demeaning effects of privilege.364
At this more elevated—and to storytellers, more principled—level of mo-
tivation the author seeks a deeper truth. Hence the Benetton story is not
about the factual events of Williams’s encounters but about the spirit
murder of all Black females by an insensitive dominant culture. To the
storyteller, focusing on objective truth, reason, and neutral analysis
“might easily lead the reader to miss the deeper truth at the heart of
Professor Williams’ story.”365 The deeper truth is thus a communal truth,
incorporating a history of oppression.366 “Patricia J. Williams is a colum-
nist (‘Diary of a Mad Lawyer,’ The Nation), and a professor of law at Co-
lumbia University. Her previous books are The Rooster’s Egg and The
Alchemy of Race and Rights. She also contributes regularly to Ms. and
The Village Voice.”367
This is the way Williams’ career is described by the publisher of her
recent book. 368 Its message is that the paradigmatic image of the public
intellectual transcends the status of law professor. It is no accident that
Morris, Bell, Delgado, and Butler have opted to participate in the public
intellectual circuit—it is the new paradigm that reaches a larger and
more diverse group of observers. The doctrinalist would read this strat-
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egy as confirming the dumbing down of scholarship by work that repu-
diates the Culture of Critical Discourse.369 The stakes of the conflict be-
tween doctrinalism and storytelling are high—without the imprimatur of
objectivity and analysis, legal scholars are vulnerable to the risk of rele-
gation to the scrape heap of the humanities who stand at the end of the
line in getting grant and research support.370
The fact that seven of the top ten appeared in top-tier law reviews
validates the emerging influence and presence of LPC. Yale, number one
in the U.S. News and World Report ranking,371 and which specializes in
pop legal culture,372 published Delgado and Butler. This also confirms
that LPC writing has moved from its original outlet in the alternative
journals like the Wisconsin Women’s Law Journal to the exclusive pages
of the most prestigious journals. The more serious implication is that the
top tier law reviews are now engaging in the public intellectual dia-
logue.373
In the final analysis the conflict between the doctrinalists and the
LPC movement will fade into the memory of history. Both sides will fall
to the onslaught of cyberspace scholarship. Self-publication on the web
will by-pass the Bluebook law review monopoly and enable authors un-
limited artistic discretion. As cyberspace author Bernard Hibbitts pre-
dicts: “The next decade could witness the end of the law review as we
know it.”374 In the new millennium, authors can illustrate text with self-
videos of encounters with sexist, liberal, white males, while I could pub-
lish the antics of my LPC colleagues oppressing me at faculty meetings.375
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Spy 7, which broadcasts NiteLifeCam for at least three hours each evening begin -
ning at eleven, funds itself by offering the humdrum vulgarities that have become
the bread and butter of the Internet. One service shows girly photographs. Another
gives a peek at some female N.Y.U. students who have wired up their dorm room. A
third had been set up to peddle an explicit sex tape of a rock star and was halted by
a restraining order before it could do so. Spy 7 cu rrently has forty-five hundred
subscribers, who pay $19.95 for a month of access.
Id.
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